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Abstract
We present a general framework for stochastic online maximization problems with combi-
natorial feasibility constraints. The framework establishes prophet inequalities by constructing
price-based online approximation algorithms, a natural extension of threshold algorithms for
settings beyond binary selection. Our analysis takes the form of an extension theorem: we
derive sufficient conditions on prices when all weights are known in advance, then prove that
the resulting approximation guarantees extend directly to stochastic settings. Our framework
unifies and simplifies much of the existing literature on prophet inequalities and posted price
mechanisms, and is used to derive new and improved results for combinatorial markets (with
and without complements), multi-dimensional matroids, and sparse packing problems. Finally,
we highlight a surprising connection between the smoothness framework for bounding the price
of anarchy of mechanisms and our framework, and show that many smooth mechanisms can be
recast as posted price mechanisms with comparable performance guarantees.
1 Introduction
A concert is being held in a local theatre, and potential audience members begin calling to reserve
seats. The organizer doesn’t know individuals’ values for seats in advance, but has distributional
knowledge about their preferences. Some need only a single seat, others require a block of seats.
Some think seats are very valuable, others are only willing to attend if tickets are very cheap.
Some prefer front-row seats, some prefer to sit a few rows back, and some prefer the balcony. The
organizer needs to decide which seats, if any, to allocate to each individual as they call. The goal
is to maximize the total value (i.e., social welfare) of the seating arrangement.
Such stochastic online optimization problems have been studied for decades. A common goal
is to attain “prophet inequalities” that compare the performance of an online algorithm to that of
an omniscient offline planner. A classic result is that if the goal is to choose exactly one element
(i.e., there is only a single seat to allocate), then a simple threshold strategy—choosing the first
value higher than a certain pre-computed threshold—yields at least half of the expected maximium
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value [34, 35, 44]. This solution has the appealing property that it corresponds to posting a take-
it-or-leave-it price and allocating to the first interested buyer. A natural question is whether more
complex allocation problems (like the concert example above) can be approximated by posting
prices and allowing buyers to select their preferred outcomes in sequence.
Driven in part by this connection to posted prices, prophet inequalities have seen a resurgence
in theoretical computer science. Recent work has established new prophet inequalities for a variety
of allocation problems, including matroids [13, 33], unit-demand bidders [13, 3], and combinatorial
auctions [23]. In this paper we develop a framework for proving prophet inequalities and construct-
ing posted-price mechanisms. Our framework, which is based on insights from economic theory,
unifies and simplifies many existing results and gives rise to new and improved prophet inequalities
in a host of online settings.
1.1 Example: Combinatorial Auctions
To introduce our framework we will consider a combinatorial auction problem. There is a setM ofm
items for sale and n buyers. Each buyer i has a valuation function vi : 2
M → R≥0 that assigns non-
negative value to every subset of at most d items.1 Valuations are non-decreasing and normalized
so that vi(∅) = 0, but otherwise arbitrary. The goal is to assign items to buyers to maximize total
value. Write v(x) =
∑n
i=1 vi(xi) for the total value of allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn), where xi ⊆ M
for all i. There is a simple O(d)-approximate greedy algorithm for this problem and a lower bound
of Ω(d/ log d) assuming P 6= NP [46]. Our goal is to match this O(d) approximation as a prophet
inequality with posted item prices. That is, given distributions over the valuations, compute prices
for the items so that, when buyers arrive in an arbitrary order and each chooses his most-desired
bundle from among the unsold items, the expected total value is an O(d) approximation to the
expected optimum.2
Let’s first consider the simpler full information case where all valuations are known in advance.
This problem is still non-trivial, and in fact there may not exist prices that lead to the optimal
allocation.3 Intuitively, what we need for an approximation result are prices that balance between
two forces. They should be small enough that high-valued buyers are willing to purchase their
optimal bundles if available, but also large enough that those items will not first be scooped up
by bidders with much lower values. Such “balanced” prices can be obtained as follows: Given
valuation profile v, consider the welfare-maximizing allocation x∗ (which we can assume allocates
all items). Then for each item j, say j ∈ x∗i , set the price of j to pj = vi(x
∗
i )/2|x
∗
i |. These prices
are low enough that the total price of all items is at most 1/2 · v(x∗), which is significantly less
than the total value of x∗. At the same time, prices are high enough that, for any set of goods
S, the total price of S is at least 1/2d of the value of allocations in the optimal allocation x∗ that
intersect S. So, in particular, a bidder that purchases S must have value at least that high.
1Alternatively, we can suppose that there is a cardinality constraint that no buyer can receive more than d items.
2There is a straightforward lower bound of Ω(d) on the approximation of any posted item prices. Suppose there
are d items and two agents. The first agent is unit-demand and has value 1 for any single item. The second agent
values the set of all d items for value d, and has value 0 for any subset. If all items have price greater than 1, then
neither agent purchases anything. If any item has price less than 1, then the unit-demand agent (who chooses first)
will purchase the cheapest single item and the other agent will purchase nothing, generating a total value of 1 whereas
the optimum is d. One can avoid issues of tie-breaking by perturbing the values by an arbitrarily small amount.
3For example, suppose there are three items and four single-minded bidders. The first three bidders each have
value 2 for a different pair of items, and the last bidder has value 3 for the set of all three items, so at most one bidder
can get positive value, and it is optimal to allocate all items to the last bidder. However, at any item prices where
the last bidder is willing to purchase, one of the other bidders will purchase first if arriving before the last bidder.
This leads to a 3/2 approximation in the worst arrival order.
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To see why these prices yield an O(d) approximation, let x denote the purchase decisions of the
players and let I ⊆ N be the set of players i such that x∗i intersects with x. The welfare achieved
by x is equal to the revenue generated plus the sum of buyer utilities. The revenue is the sum of
prices of the items sold, and since prices are “balanced” this is at least (1/2d) ·
∑
i∈I vi(x
∗
i ). Also,
each buyer i 6∈ I could have chosen to purchase x∗i , and therefore must get at least as much utility
as they would by purchasing x∗i , which is vi(x
∗
i ) minus the price of x
∗
i . Again, since prices are
balanced, this means the sum of buyer utilities is at least
∑
i 6∈I vi(x
∗
i ) − 1/2 · v(x
∗). Multiplying
this by 1/2d and adding the revenue gives an O(d) approximation.4.
The argument above was for the full information case. Perhaps surprisingly, the existence of
sufficiently “balanced” prices for full information instances also establishes an O(d)-approximate
prophet inequality for the general stochastic problem, where one has only distributional knowl-
edge about valuations. Our main result is this reduction from the stochastic setting to the full
information setting, which holds for a broad class of allocation problems.
1.2 A Framework for Prophet Inequalities
Consider a more general combinatorial allocation problem, where the cardinality constraint d is
replaced with an arbitrary downward-closed feasibility constraint F and each vi is drawn indepen-
dently from an arbitrary distribution Di. While our framework applies for more general outcome
spaces (see Sections 2 and 3), combinatorial allocation problems provide a sweet spot between
expressiveness and clarity. Our key definition is the following notion of balanced prices for full-
information instances. For each x ∈ F we write OPT(v | x) for the optimal residual allocation: the
allocation that maximizes
∑
i vi(x
′
i) over x
′ ∈ F with x,x′ disjoint and x ∪ x′ ∈ F . Given a fixed
valuation profile v, a pricing rule defines a price pvi (xi) for every bundle that we can assign to buyer
i. For example, the item prices described in Section 1.1 define a pricing rule pvi (xi) =
∑
j∈xi
pj .
Below we also extend the definition to dynamic prices, i.e., prices that depend on which allocations
have already been made.
Key Definition (special case) ((α, β)-balanced prices). Let α, β > 0. A pricing rule pv =
(pv1 , . . . , p
v
n) defined by functions p
v
i : 2
M → R≥0 is (α, β)-balanced with respect to valuation profile
v if for all x ∈ F and all x′ ∈ F with x,x′ disjoint and x ∪ x′ ∈ F ,
(a)
∑
i p
v
i (xi) ≥
1
α(v(OPT(v)) − v(OPT(v | x))) ,
(b)
∑
i p
v
i (x
′
i) ≤ β v(OPT(v | x)) .
The first condition formalizes what it means that prices are high enough: the sum of prices for
x should partially cover the welfare lost due to allocating x. The second condition formalizes “low
enough:” the sum of prices for any x′ that is still feasible “after” allocating x should not be much
higher than the optimal residual welfare.
Our main result is that the existence of balanced prices for full information instances directly
implies a price-based prophet inequality for the stochastic setting. The idea to choose balanced
prices is a natural one and has appeared in the prophet inequality literature before, most explicitly
in the notion of balanced thresholds of Kleinberg and Weinberg [33]. Previous definitions, however,
applied to the stochastic setting directly, which made the construction and analysis of balanced
thresholds inherently probabilistic. A main advantage of our framework is that it suffices to reason
about the simpler full-information setting.
4 For simplicity we assumed here that
∑
i6∈I vi(x
∗
i ) − 1/2 · v(x
∗) ≥ 0. More generally, since utilities are non-
negative, the sum of buyer utilities is at least max{
∑
i6∈I vi(x
∗
i ) − 1/2 · v(x
∗), 0}. If the maximum is attained at 0,
then
∑
i∈I vi(x
∗
i ) > 1/2 · v(x
∗) and the revenue alone exceeds (1/4d) · v(x∗), as desired.
3
Main Theorem (informal). Consider the setting where valuations are drawn from product dis-
tribution D. Suppose that the pricing rule pv is (α, β)-balanced with respect to valuation profile v.
Then posting prices
pi(xi) =
α
1 + αβ
Ev˜∼D
[
pv˜i (xi)
]
achieves welfare at least 11+αβE[v (OPT(v))].
In other words, to construct appropriate prices for a stochastic problem instance, it suffices
to construct balanced prices for the full-information instances in its support and then post the
expected values of those prices, scaled by an appropriate factor. The proof of our main theorem is
similar in spirit to proofs in the Price of Anarchy literature [41, 45] or for establishing algorithmic
stability [29], in that it uses “ghost samples.” It is, however, considerably more involved because
of the sequential, online aspect of our problem.
Remark 1.1 (Weakly Balanced Prices). We also define a notion of weakly balanced prices, in which
it suffices to upper bound the prices by βv(OPT(v)). In this case, we can show that posting an
appropriately scaled version of the expected prices yields a 1/4αβ-approximate prophet inequality.
Remark 1.2 (Computation). It is sometimes easier to compute prices that are balanced with
respect to an approximation algorithm ALG rather than OPT. Our result still applies in this
case, with OPT replaced by ALG in the welfare guarantee. We also note that if the price rule
p in the main theorem is perturbed to some pˆ with ||p − pˆ||∞ < ǫ, then the welfare guarantee
degrades by at most an additive O(nǫ) term. This robustness is desirable in itself, and also implies
that appropriate prices can be computed for bounded values with poly(n,m, 1/ǫ) samples using
standard concentration bounds, as has been observed for various posted price settings [12, 23].
Remark 1.3 (Static vs. Dynamic, Anonymous vs. Discriminatory, Bundle vs. Item Pricing). We
have described our framework for static, discriminatory, bundle prices. In general, our construction
has the property that if the full-information balanced prices pv are dynamic, anonymous, and/or
take the form of item prices, then the derived prices for the stochastic setting will have these
properties as well. For example, our result holds also for dynamic prices, replacing pi(xi) and
pi(x
′
i) with pi(xi | x[i−1]) and pi(x
′
i | x[i−1]) where the conditioning on x[i−1] indicates that the price
to player i may depend on the purchase decisions of players that precede him. See Sections 2 and
3 for details.
Remark 1.4 (Arrival Order). Balancedness can depend on player arrival order. In the applications
we consider, our results hold even if the arrival order is chosen by an adaptive adversary that
observes previous realized values and purchase decisions before selecting the next player to arrive.
Let’s return to our example from Section 1.1. We established the existence of weakly (d, 1)-
balanced prices (simply undo the scaling by 1/2), so our main result implies a O(d)-approximate
prophet inequality. What about computation? We can compute prices in polynomial time by
basing them on the O(d)-approximate greedy algorithm (rather than the optimal allocation), but
then we only get a O(d2)-approximate solution. It turns out that we can further improve this
to O(d) in polynomial time, as we hoped for in Section 1.1, by applying our main theorem to a
fractional relaxation of the auction problem. See Section 4 for more details.
Composition We also show that balanced prices “compose”, as was shown for mechanism
smoothness in [45]. This means that to derive a prophet inequality for a complex setting it of-
ten suffices to show balancedness for a simpler problem. See Appendix C.
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Feasibility
Constraint
Valuation
Class
Pricing Model Upper Bound Query
Model
Combinatorial
Auction
XOS Static, anonymous item prices 2ee−1 [23]
2 [this work]
XOS,
Demand
Combinatorial
Auction
MPH-k Static, anonymous item prices O(k2) [23]
4k − 2 [this work]
MPH,
Demand
Matroid Submodular Dynamic prices 2 (existential)
4 (computational)
Value
Knapsack Additive Static, anonymous prices 3 Explicit
d-Sparse PIPs Additive Static, anonymous prices 8d Explicit
Table 1: Overview of applications. Results are computational unless otherwise stated. The query
model refers to the valuation access needed for the computational upper bounds, where “explicit”
indicates that valuations can be described explicitly. All results are order oblivious (see Section 2).
1.3 Unification of Existing Prophet Inequality Proofs
Our framework unifies and simplifies many of the existing prophet inequality proofs. We list some
representative examples below. We discuss the first example in more detail in Appendix A. The
other two examples are covered in Appendices D and F.
Example 1.1 (Classic Prophet Inequality, [34, 35]). The goal is to pick the single highest-value
element vi. The pricing rule p
v defined by pvi (xi) = maxi vi for all i is (1, 1)-balanced.
Example 1.2 (Matroids, [33]). The goal is to pick a maximum weight independent set in a matroid.
Encode sets S by n-dimensional vectors x over {0, 1} such that xi = 1 if i ∈ S. Then one can define
a dynamic pricing rule pv by pi(xi | y) = v(OPT(v | y)) − v(OPT(v | y ∪ xi)) for all i, where y is
the set of previously-selected elements. This pricing rule is (1, 1)-balanced.
Example 1.3 (XOS Combinatorial Auctions, [23]). The goal is to assign m goods to n buyers with
XOS valuations5. Let x∗ = OPT(v) and let a1, . . . , an be the corresponding additive supporting
functions. Set item prices pj = ai(j) for j ∈ x
∗
i . This pricing rule is (1, 1)-balanced.
The final example illustrates the power of our composition results (see Appendix C): the exis-
tence of (1, 1)-balanced prices for XOS combinatorial auctions, and hence a 2-approximate prophet
inequality, follows directly from the existence of (1, 1)-balanced prices for a single item, despite
being significantly more complex. It also yields a O(logm)-approximate prophet inequality for
subadditive valuations by approximating subadditive valuations with XOS valuations [17, 9].
1.4 New and Improved Prophet Inequalities
We also establish new prophet inequalities using our framework; see Table 1. Our first result is a
poly-time (4k − 2)-approximate prophet inequality for MPH-k combinatorial auctions6.
5A valuation v is XOS if there is a collection of additive functions a1(·), . . . , ak(·), such that for every set S,
v(S) = max1≤i≤k ai(S). This is a generalization of submodular valuations [37].
6The maximum over positive hypergraphs-k (MPH-k) hierarchy of valuations [21] is an inclusive hierarchy, where
k measures the degree of complementarity.
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Theorem 1.1 (Combinatorial auctions with MPH-k valuations). For combinatorial auctions with
MPH-k valuations, a (4k− 2+ ǫ)-approximate posted-price mechanism, with static item prices, can
be computed in poly(n,m, 1/ǫ) demand and MPH-k queries.
Theorem 1.1 improves the poly-time result of [23] from O(k2) to O(k). We note two interesting
special cases. First, combinatorial auctions with bundle size d (from Section 1.1) belong to MPH-d,
so Theorem 1.1 captures the polytimeO(d) approximation discussed above. Second, XOS valuations
coincide with MPH-1, so Theorem 1.1 improves the previously best known poly-time result of [23]
from 2e/(e − 1) to 2, matching the existential lower bound. See Section 4 and Appendix D.
The second set of new results includes Knapsack feasibility constraints and d-sparse Packing
Integer Programs (PIPs), for which we obtain a constant- and a O(d)-approximation, respectively.
These settings are presented in Sections 4 and E, respectively.
Theorem 1.2 (Knapsack). For Knapsack constraints, a factor (5 + ǫ)-approximate posted-price
mechanism, with static prices, can be computed in poly(n, 1/ǫ). This improves to a (3+ ǫ) approx-
imation if no individual demands more than half of the total capacity.
Theorem 1.3 (Sparse PIPs). For d-sparse Packing Integer Programs (PIPs) with constraint matrix
A ∈ Rm×n≥0 where aj,i ≤ 1/2 for all i, j and unit capacities, a factor (8d+ǫ)-approximate posted-price
mechanism, with static prices, can be computed in time poly(n,m, 1/ǫ).
To the best of our knowledge, Theorems 1.2 and 1.3 are the first prophet inequalities for these
settings. We note that [24] derived a prophet inequality for closely-related fractional knapsack
constraints, with approximation factor ≈ 11.657. We obtain an improved prophet inequality for this
fractional setting: a corollary of Theorem 1.1 (with k = 1) is that one can obtain a 2-approximation
for a fractional knapsack constraint using a static per-unit price, even when knapsack weights are
private and arbitrarily correlated with buyer values. See Section 4 for more details.
Finally, in Appendix F we generalize the matroid prophet inequalities of Kleinberg andWeinberg
[33] to settings where players make choices regarding multiple elements of a matroid, and have
submodular preferences over subsets of elements.
Theorem 1.4 (Multi-Dimensional Matroids). For matroid feasibility constraints and submodular
valuations, there is a (4 + ǫ)-approximate posted-price mechanism, with dynamic prices, that can
be computed in poly(n, 1/ǫ) value queries.
1.5 From Price of Anarchy to Prophet Inequalities
In the proof sketch in Section 1.1, we derived a lower bound on buyer utility by considering a
deviation to a certain purchasing decision. This deviation argument, which appears in the proof of
our main result, is also useful for establishing Price of Anarchy bounds [41, 45]. There is a subtle
but important difference, however. In smoothness proofs one considers deviations against a fixed
strategy profile, while the prophet inequality problem is inherently temporal and agents deviate at
different points in time. As it turns out, many smoothness proofs have a built-in charging scheme
(which we refer to as outcome smoothness) that, under the assumption that critical payments are
monotonically increasing, implies prophet inequalities with the same (asymptotic) approximation
guarantee. We provide examples showing that both outcome smoothness and monotonicity are
necessary for this result to hold. We also provide two “black-box reductions” for binary single-
parameter settings, where PoA guarantees of O(γ) established by (normal) smoothness imply O(γ2)-
approximate prophet inequalities. See Section 5.
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Theorem 1.5 (informal). For general multi-parameter problems, if the first-price (i.e., pay-your-
bid) mechanism based on declared welfare maximization has a Price of Anarchy of O(γ) provable
via outcome smoothness, and critical payments are monotonically increasing, then posting a scaled
version of the critical payments yields a O(γ)-approximate price-based prophet inequality.
Using these results we can, for example, rederive the classic prophet inequality [34, 35] from
the smoothness of the first-price single-item auction [45] or the matroid prophet inequality [33]
from the smoothness of the pay-your-bid, declared welfare maximizing mechanism for selecting a
maximum-weight basis [39].
1.6 Further Related Work
Prophet inequalities and their applicability as posted-price mechanisms were (re-)discovered in the-
oretical computer science by [28]. Subsequently, threshold-based prophet inequalities and posted-
price mechanisms were developed for matroids and matroid intersection [13, 33, 7], polymatroids
[20], unit-demand bidders [13, 3], and combinatorial auctions [3, 23].
Not all prophet inequalities in the literature are based on explicit thresholds. Examples include
prophet inequalities for the generalized assignment problem [4, 5], matroids and matroid intersec-
tion [26], and for general binary feasibility constraints [42]. On the other hand, many posted-price
mechanisms from the literature are constructed either without explicit reference to prophet inequal-
ities or via different techniques. Chawla et al. [12] developed approximately-optimal (revenue-wise)
posted-price mechanisms for unit-demand buyers. Posted-price mechanisms have subsequently been
developed for a variety of other auction settings [18, 8, 11, 6]. Dynamic posted prices that give
optimal welfare for unit-demand buyers were established in [15]. Recently, dynamic posted prices
for various online settings have been considered, including k-server on the line and metrical task
systems [14], and makespan minimization for scheduling problems [27].
Most recently, and in parallel to this work combinatorial prophet inequalities were developed
in [43] and [10]. The former, amongst others, proves prophet inequalities for subadditive CAs, but
considers a different allocation model and is therefore imcomparable. The latter, in turn, focuses
on revenue and not welfare as we do here. Finally, [1] re-considers the classic prophet inequality
setting, but in a large market setting and assuming random or best order.
The notion of smooth games was introduced by Roughgarden [41] as a tool for bounding the
price of anarchy, which measures the inefficiency that can be incurred in equilibrium. This notion
has been extended to mechanisms by Syrgkanis and Tardos [45]. Notions of outcome smoothness
were considered in [16, 40].
2 General Model and Notation
Problem Formulation There is a set N of n agents. For each agent i ∈ N there is an outcome
space Xi containing a null outcome ∅. We write X = X1 × . . . ×Xn for the joint outcome space.
Given outcome profile x ∈ X and a subset of agents S ⊆ N , we will write xS for the outcome in
which each i ∈ S receives xi and each i 6∈ S receives ∅. Specifically, we will write x[i−1] for allocation
x with the outcomes of agents i, . . . , n set to ∅. There is a subset F ⊆ X of feasible outcomes. We
will assume that F is downward-closed, so that if x ∈ F then also xS ∈ F for all S ⊆ N .
A valuation function for agent i is a function vi : Xi → R≥0. We will assume values are
bounded, and without loss of generality scaled to lie in [0, 1]. Each agent i’s valuation vi is drawn
independently from a publicly known distribution Di. We write D = D1× · · · ×Dn for the product
distribution over the set V = V1 × · · · × Vn of valuation profiles. We often suppress dependence on
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D from our notation when clear from context. Agent utilities are quasilinear: if agent i receives
outcome xi and makes a payment πi, his utility is ui = vi(xi)− πi.
The welfare of outcome x is v(x) =
∑
i vi(xi). An outcome rule ALG maps each valuation
profile to a feasible outcome. ALGi(v) denotes the outcome of agent i on input v. We will write
OPT(v,F) = argmaxx∈F{v(x)} for the welfare-maximizing outcome rule for F , omitting the
dependence on F when it is clear from context.
Pricing Rules and Mechanisms A pricing rule is a profile of functions p = (p1, . . . , pn) that
assign prices to outcomes. We write pi(xi | y) for the (non-negative) price assigned to outcome
xi ∈ Xi, offered to agent i, given partial allocation y ∈ F . Define pi(xi) = pi(xi | ∅) for convenience.
We require that pi(xi | y) = ∞ for any xi such that (xi,y−i) 6∈ F . A pricing rule is said to be
monotone non-decreasing if pi(xi | y) ≥ pi(xi | yS) for all i, xi ∈ Xi, y ∈ X, (xi,y−i) ∈ F , and
S ⊆ N . In general, we allow prices to be dynamic and discriminatory. We refer to prices that
do not depend on the partial allocation (apart from feasibility) as static and to prices that do not
depend on the identity of the agent as anonymous.
A posted-price mechanism is defined by a pricing rule p and an ordering over the agents. This
pricing rule can, in general, depend on the distributions D. The agents are approached sequentially.
Each agent i is presented the menu of prices determined by pi, given all previous allocations, and
selects a utility-maximizing outcome. A posted-price mechanism is order-oblivious if it does not
require the agents to be processed in a specific order. In all of the applications we consider, the
mechanisms we construct are order-oblivious. It is well-known that every posted-price mechanism
is truthful [13].
Online Allocations and Prophet Inequalities We consider stochastic allocation algorithms
that can depend on the value distributions D. That is, an allocation algorithm A maps a value
profile and distribution to a feasible outcome. We say A is an online allocation algorithm if Ai(v,D)
does not depend on the entries of v that occur after i in some ordering over the indices. Extending
the notion of competitive ratio from the worst-case analysis of online algorithms, we’ll say the
(stochastic) competitive ratio of online allocation algorithm A is
max
D
Ev∼D[v(OPT(v))]
Ev∼D[v(A(v,D))]
.
We somtimes refer to a competitive ratio using its inverse, when convenient. A prophet inequality
for constraint F is an upper bound on the stochastic competitive ratio of an online allocation
algorithm for F . We note that a posted-price mechanism describes a particular form of an online
allocation algorithm.
3 A Framework for Prophet Inequalities
In this section we state and prove our main result, which reduces prophet inequalities to finding
balanced prices for the simpler full information setting. We say that a set of outcome profiles
H ⊆ X is exchange compatible with x ∈ F if for all y ∈ H and all i ∈ N , (yi,x−i) ∈ F . We call a
family of sets (Fx)x∈X exchange compatible if Fx is exchange compatible with x for all x ∈ X.
Definition 3.1. Let α > 0, β ≥ 0. Given a set of feasible outcomes F and a valuation profile v,
a pricing rule p is (α, β)-balanced with respect to an allocation rule ALG, an exchange-compatible
family of sets (Fx)x∈X , and an indexing of the players i = 1, . . . , n if for all x ∈ F
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(a)
∑
i∈N pi(xi | x[i−1]) ≥
1
α ·
(
v(ALG(v))− v(OPT(v,Fx)
)
, and
(b) for all x′ ∈ Fx:
∑
i∈N pi(x
′
i | x[i−1]) ≤ β · v(OPT(v,Fx)).
The definition provides flexibility in the precise choice of Fx. As Fx becomes larger (more
permissive), both inequalities become easier to satisfy since v(OPT(v,Fx)) increases. On the other
hand, a larger set Fx means that the second condition must be satisfied for more outcomes x
′ ∈ Fx.
We say that a collection of pricing rules (pv)v∈V is (α, β)-balanced if there exists a choice of (Fx)x∈X
such that, for each v, the pricing rule pv is balanced with respect to (Fx)x∈X .
The definition of (α, β)-balancedness captures sufficient conditions for a posted-price mechanism
to guarantee high welfare when agents have a known valuation profile v. Our interest in (α, β)-
balanced pricing rules comes from the fact that this result extends to Bayesian settings.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that the collection of pricing rules (pv)v∈V for feasible outcomes F and
valuation profiles v ∈ V is (α, β)-balanced with respect to allocation rule ALG and indexing of the
players i = 1, . . . , n. Then for δ = α1+αβ the posted-price mechanism with pricing rule δp, where
pi(xi | y) = Ev˜[p
v˜
i (xi | y)], generates welfare at least
1
1+αβ · Ev[v(ALG(v))] when approaching
players in the order they are indexed.
Proof. We denote the exchange-compatible family of sets with respect to which the collection of
pricing rules (pv)v∈V is balanced by (Fx)x∈X . We will first use Property (b) to show a lower
bound on the utilities of the players, and Property (a) to show a lower bound on the revenue of the
posted-price mechanism. We will then add these together to obtain a bound on the social welfare.
We will write x(v) for the allocation returned by the posted-price mechanism on input valuation
profile v and x′(v,v′) = OPT(v′,Fx(v)) for the welfare-maximizing allocation with respect to
valuation profile v′ under feasibility constraint Fx(v).
Utility bound: We obtain a lower bound on the expected utility of a player as follows. We
sample valuations v′ ∼ D. Player i now considers buying OPTi((vi,v
′
−i),Fx(v′i,v−i)) at price
δ·pi(OPTi((vi,v
′
−i),Fx(v′i,v−i)) | x[i−1](v)). Taking expectations and exploiting that x[i−1](v) does
not depend on vi we obtain
E
v
[ui(v)] ≥ E
v,v′
[
vi
(
OPTi((vi,v
′
−i),Fx(v′i,v−i))
)
− δ · pi
(
OPTi((vi,v
′
−i),Fx(v′i,v−i))
∣∣∣ x[i−1](v))]
= E
v,v′
[
v′i
(
x′i(v,v
′)
)
− δ · pi
(
x′i(v,v
′)
∣∣∣ x[i−1](v))] .
Summing the previous inequality over all agents we get
E
v
[∑
i∈N
ui(v)
]
≥ E
v,v′
[∑
i∈N
v′i
(
x′i(v,v
′)
)]
− E
v,v′
[∑
i∈N
δ · pi
(
x′i(v,v
′)
∣∣∣∣ x[i−1](v)
)]
= E
v,v′
[
v′
(
OPT(v′,Fx(v))
)]
− E
v,v′
[∑
i∈N
δ · pi
(
x′i(v,v
′)
∣∣∣∣ x[i−1](v)
)]
. (1)
We can upper bound the last term in the previous inequality by using Property (b). This gives∑
i∈N
δ · pi
(
x′i(v,v
′)
∣∣∣ x[i−1](v)) ≤ δβ · E
v˜
[
v˜
(
OPT(v˜,Fx(v))
)]
pointwise for any v and v′, and therefore also
E
v,v′
[∑
i∈N
δ · pi
(
x′i(v,v
′)
∣∣∣ x[i−1](v))
]
≤ δβ · E
v,v˜
[
v˜
(
OPT(v˜,Fx(v))
)]
. (2)
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Replacing v′ with v˜ in Inequality (1) and combining it with Inequality (2) we obtain
E
v
[∑
i∈N
ui(v)
]
≥ (1− δβ) · E
v,v˜
[
v˜
(
OPT(v˜,Fx(v))
)]
. (3)
Revenue bound: The second step is a lower bound on the revenue achieved by the posted-price
mechanism. Applying Property (a) we obtain
∑
i∈N
δ · pi(xi(v) | x[i−1](v)) = δ ·
∑
i∈N
E
v˜
[
pv˜i (xi(v) | x[i−1](v))
]
≥
δ
α
· E
v˜
[
v˜(ALG(v˜))− v˜(OPT(v˜,Fx(v)))
]
.
Taking expectation over v this shows
E
v
[∑
i∈N
δ · pi(xi(v) | x[i−1](v))
]
≥
δ
α
· E
v˜
[v˜(ALG(v˜))]−
δ
α
· E
v˜,v
[
v˜(OPT(v˜,Fx(v)))
]
. (4)
Combination: It remains to show how the two bounds can be combined so that they imply the
approximation guarantee. By quasi-linearity we can rewrite the expected social welfare that is
achieved by the posted-price mechanism as the sum of the expected utilities plus the expected
revenue. Using δ = α/(1 + αβ) and Inequalities (3) and (4), this gives
E
v
[∑
i∈N
vi(xi(v))
]
≥ E
v
[∑
i∈N
ui(v)
]
+ E
v
[∑
i∈N
δ · pi
(
xi(v) | x[i−1](v)
)]
≥ (1− δβ) E
v,v˜
[
v˜(OPT(v˜,Fx(v)))
]
+
δ
α
E
v˜
[v˜(ALG(v˜))] −
δ
α
E
v˜,v
[
v˜(OPT(v˜,Fx(v)))
]
=
1
1 + αβ
E
v˜
[v˜(ALG(v˜)] .
In what follows, we provide an alternative definition of balancedness, in which Property (b) is
refined. This definition will be useful for some applications, as exemplified in Section 4.
Definition 3.2. Let α > 0, β1, β2 ≥ 0. Given a set of feasible outcomes F and a valuation profile
v, a pricing rule p is weakly (α, β1, β2)-balanced with respect to allocation rule ALG, an exchange-
compatible family of sets (Fx)x∈X , and an indexing of the players i = 1, . . . , n if, for all x ∈ F ,
(a)
∑
i∈N pi(xi | x[i−1]) ≥
1
α ·
(
v(ALG(v))− v(OPT(v,Fx)
)
, and
(b) for all x′ ∈ Fx:
∑
i∈N pi(x
′
i | x[i−1]) ≤ β1 · v(OPT(v,Fx)) + β2 · v(ALG(v)).
The following theorem specifies the refined bound on the welfare that is obtained by weakly
(α, β1, β2)-balanced pricing rules. Its proof appears in Appendix B.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that the collection of pricing rules (pv)v∈V for feasible outcomes F and
valuation profiles v ∈ V is weakly (α, β1, β2)-balanced with respect to allocation ALG and indexing
of the players i = 1, . . . , n with β1 + β2 ≥
1
α . Then for δ =
1
β1+max{2β2,1/α}
the posted-price
mechanism with pricing rule δp, where pi(xi | y) = Ev˜[p
v˜
i (xi | y)], generates welfare at least
1
α(2β1+4β2)
· Ev[v(ALG(v))] when approaching players in the order they are indexed.
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4 New and Improved Prophet Inequalities
We have already argued that our framework unifies and simplifies many of the existing prophet
inequality proofs. In this section we show how it can be used to derive new and improved bounds
on the approximation ratio that can be obtained via price-based prophet inequalities. We highlight
two results: the new poly-time O(d)-approximation for combinatorial auctions with bundle size at
most d, and the new poly-time constant-approximation for knapsack problems. Additional results
include combinatorial auctions with MPH-k valuations (see Appendix D), d-sparse packing integer
programs (see Appendix E) and multi-dimensional matroids (where the result follows from the
Rota exchange theorem [36, Lemma 2.7] and our composition results, see Appendix F).
Combinatorial Auctions with Bounded Bundle Size An existential O(d)-approximate price-
based prophet inequality is presented in Section 1.1. Combined with the O(d)-approximation greedy
algorithm for this setting, it gives a poly-time O(d2)-approximate price-based prophet inequality
(as shown in [23]). In what follows we use the flexibility of our framework to work directly with a
relaxation of the allocation problem, thereby improving the approximation of the prophet inequality
from O(d2) to O(d). This is a special case of Theorem 1.1, which is proved in Appendix D.
Theorem 4.1. For combinatorial auctions where every agent can get at most d items, there exist
weakly (1, 1, d− 1)-balanced item prices that are static, anonymous, and order oblivious. Moreover,
a (4d − 2 − ǫ)-approximate posted-price mechanism can be computed in poly(n,m, 1/ǫ) demand
queries, where ǫ is an additive error due to sampling.
Proof. Consider the canonical fractional relaxation of the combinatorial auction problem: a feasible
allocation is described by values xi,S ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ N and S ⊆ M such that
∑
S xi,S ≤ 1 for
all i and
∑
i,S∋j xi,S ≤ 1 for all j ∈ M . Take F to be all such fractional allocations, and Fx to be
the set of fractional allocations y such that
∑
i,S∋j(xi,S + yi,S) ≤ 1 for all j ∈M , and
∑
S yi,S ≤ 1
for all i. As usual, we think of Fx as the set of allocations that remain feasible given a partial
allocation x.
Consider the following pricing rule for fractional allocations. Given valuation profile v, let x∗
be the welfare-maximizing fractional allocation. Then for each item j, set pj =
∑
i
∑
S∋j x
∗
i,Svi(S).
We claim that these prices are (1, 1, d − 1)-balanced with respect to the optimal allocation rule.
For Property (a), fix some x ∈ F . Write xj =
∑
i,S∋j xi,S. Consider the following allocation
y ∈ Fx: for each S, choose jS ∈ argmaxj∈S{x
j}. Set yi,S = (1 − x
jS) · x∗i,S. We think of y as the
optimal allocation x∗ adjusted downward to lie in Fx. We then have that
v(x∗)− v(y) =
∑
i
∑
S
xjS · x∗i,S · vi(S) =
∑
j
xj
∑
i,S : j=jS
x∗i,S · vi(S) ≤
∑
j
xj · pj =
∑
i
pi(xi).
Property (a) follows since v(y) ≤ v(OPT(v,Fx)). For Property (b), fix x ∈ F and x
′ ∈ Fx. Then∑
i
pi(x
′
i) ≤
∑
j
(1− xj)pj =
∑
j
(1− xj)
∑
i,S∋j
x∗i,S · vi(S) =
∑
i,S
x∗i,S · vi(S)
∑
j∈S
(1− xj)
=
∑
i,S
(|S| − 1)x∗i,S · vi(S) +
∑
i,S
x∗i,S · vi(S) ·

1−∑
j∈S
xj

 .
The first expression on the RHS is at most (d − 1)v(OPT(v)), since |S| ≤ d whenever x∗i,S > 0.
For the second expression, note that it is at most the welfare of the allocation y defined by yi,S =
11
x∗i,S · (1 −
∑
j∈S x
j)+. Moreover, this allocation y is in Fx. So the second expression is at most
v(OPT(v,Fx)), giving Property (b).
Theorem 3.2 therefore yields prices that guarantee a (4d − 2) approximation for the fractional
allocation problem, and an ǫ-approximation to those prices can be computed via sampling. To
complete the proof, note that for every agent i, if all previous agents have selected integral outcomes,
then agent i also has a utility-maximizing outcome that is integral. This is because any fractional
allocation can be interpreted as a convex combination of integral allocations. These same prices
therefore guarantee a (4d − 2 − ǫ) approximation even if the mechanism prohibits non-integral
allocations from being purchased.
The more general Theorem 1.1 also improves the best-known polytime prophet inequality for
XOS valuations from 2e/(e−1) to 2 (which is tight [23]) and for MPH-k valuations it improves the
best known polytime bounds from O(k2) to O(k).
Knapsack In the knapsack allocation problem, there is a single divisible unit of resource and each
agent has a private value vi ≥ 0 for receiving at least si ≥ 0 units. Assume for now that si ≤ 1/2
for all i. We allow both vi and si to be private information, drawn from a joint distribution. In
our notation: Xi = [0,
1
2 ], F = {x |
∑
i xi ≤ 1}, and vi(xi) = vi if xi ≥ si and vi(xi) = 0 otherwise.
Based on an arbitrary allocation algorithm ALG, we design anonymous, static prices by setting
pi(xi | y) = xi · v(ALG(v)) if xi can feasibly be added and ∞ otherwise. The following restates the
second half of Theorem 1.2.
Theorem 4.2. For the knapsack allocation problem in which no single agent can request more than
half of the total capacity, the prices above are (1, 2)-balanced with respect to ALG. This implies a
(3+ ǫ)-approximate polytime posted-price mechanism with a single static anonymous per-unit price.
Proof. The polytime claim follows from Theorem 3.1 with ALG set to the classic FPTAS for knap-
sack [31], so it suffices to prove balancedness. For any x ∈ F , let Fx = F if
∑
i xi <
1
2 , and Fx = ∅
otherwise. Note that Fx is exchange compatible with x since, for any x
′ ∈ Fx and any agent k,
x′k +
∑
i xi ≤ 1. To establish balancedness with respect to (Fx)x, we consider two cases based on
the value of
∑
i xi.
Case 1:
∑
i xi <
1
2 . Property (a) is trivially fulfilled because v(ALG(v)) − v(OPT(v,Fx)) ≤
v(OPT(v)) − v(OPT(v,Fx)) = 0. For Property b, note that for any x
′ ∈ Fx, we have∑
i
pi(x
′
i | x[i−1]) =
∑
i
x′i · v(ALG(v)) ≤ v(ALG(v)) ≤ v(OPT(v)) = v(OPT(v,Fx)).
Case 2:
∑
i xi ≥
1
2 . Property (b) is vacuous since Fx = ∅. For Property (a), we have∑
i
pi(xi | x[i−1]) =
∑
i
xi · v(ALG(v)) ≥
1
2
v(ALG(v)) =
1
2
(v(ALG(v)) − v(OPT(v,Fx))).
We can remove the restriction that si ≤ 1/2 as follows, completing the proof of Theorem 1.2.
Consider the contribution to the expected optimal welfare separated into welfare from agents with
si ≤ 1/2, and agents with si > 1/2. The posted-price mechanism described above obtains a
3-approximation to the former. For the latter, a mechanism that treats the unit of resource as
indivisible, and posts the best take-it-or-leave-it price for the entire unit, is a 2-approximation.
This is because at most one agent with si > 1/2 can win in any realization. Thus, for any
distribution profile, one of these two mechanisms must be a 5-approximation to the unrestricted
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knapsack problem.7 One can therefore obtain a (5+ ǫ)-approximate price-based prophet inequality
by estimating the expected welfare of each pricing scheme (via sampling) and selecting the better of
the two. In Appendix E we show how to generalize the result for the knapsack problem to d-sparse
packing integer programs.
Finally, consider the fractional version of the knapsack problem, where agents obtain partial
value for receiving a portion of their desired allocation: vi(xi) = vi · min{xi/si, 1}. If we restrict
allocations xi to be multiples of some δ > 0, this is a special case of a submodular combinatorial
auction with ⌈1/δ⌉ identical items. Since Theorem 1.1 implies that a fixed per-item price yields
a 2-approximation for any δ, we can infer by taking the limit as δ → 0 that for any ǫ > 0 there
is a (2 + ǫ)-approximate polytime posted-price mechanism for the fractional knapsack problem,
with a single static anonymous per-unit price, even if each agent’s size si is private and arbitrarily
correlated with their value. As mentioned in Section 1.4, this improves the previously best-known
prophet inequality of ≈ 11.657 due to [24].
5 From Price of Anarchy to Prophet Inequalities
In this section we explore the connection between balanced prices and mechanism smoothness.
While generally smoothness does not suffice to conclude the existence of a posted-price mechanism
with comparable welfare guarantee (see Appendix G), we will show that this is the case for typical
smoothness proofs and present pretty general reductions from the problem of proving prophet
inequalities to mechanism smoothness.
We first recall the definition of a smooth mechanism. A (possibly indirect) mechanism Mπ for
an allocation problem π is defined by a bid space B = B1× · · ·×Bn, an allocation rule f : B → F ,
and a payment rule P : B → Rn≥0. We focus on first-price mechanisms, where Pi(b) = bi(f(b)).
Typically, mechanisms are defined for a collection of problems Π, in which case we will simply refer
to the mechanism as M.
Definition 5.1 (Syrgkanis and Tardos [45]). Mechanism Mπ is (λ, µ)-smooth for λ, µ ≥ 0 if for
any valuation profile v ∈ V and any bid profile b ∈ B there exists a bid b′i(v, bi) ∈ Bi for each
player i ∈ N such that ∑
i∈N
ui(b
′
i,b-i) ≥ λ · v(OPT(v)) − µ ·
∑
i∈N
Pi(b).
A mechanism M that is (λ, µ)-smooth has a Price of Anarchy (with respect to correlated and
Bayes-Nash equilibria) of at most max{µ, 1}/λ [45].
The following formal notion of a residual market will be useful for our further analysis. For
any x ∈ F we define the contraction of F by x, F/x, as follows. Let N+(x) = {i ∈ N | xi 6= ∅}.
Then F/x = {z = (zj)j∈N\N+(x) | (z,xN+(x)) ∈ F}. That is, F/x contains allocations to players
who were allocated nothing in x, that remain feasible when combined with the allocations in x.
We think of the contraction by x as a subinstance on players N \N+(x) with feasibility constraint
F/x, and refer to it as the subinstance induced by x. We say that a collection of problems Π is
subinstance closed if for every π ∈ Π with feasible allocations F and every x ∈ F the subinstance
induced by x is contained in Π. The contraction by x also naturally leads to an exchange feasible
set Fx by padding the allocations z ∈ F/x with null outcomes. We refer to this Fx as the canonical
exchange-feasible set.
7The worst case is when both mechanisms achieve the same expected welfare, which occurs if 3/5 of the expected
welfare is due to agents with si ≤ 1/2. The expected welfare of each mechanism is then
1
3
· 3
5
= 1
5
of the optimum.
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5.1 Warm-up: Binary, Single-Parameter Problems with Monotone Prices
We begin with a simple result that serves to illustrate the connection between balancedness and
smoothness. We will show that if a binary, single-parameter problem has the property that the
welfare-maximizing mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth and its critical prices τi( · | y) are non-decreasing
in y,8 then there exists a pricing rule that is (α, β)-balanced, where αβ = O(max{µ, 1}/λ). In
particular, this implies that the welfare guarantee due to Theorem 3.1 is within a constant factor
of the Price of Anarchy of the mechanism implied by smoothness.
Theorem 5.1. Consider a subinstance-closed collection of binary, single-parameter problems such
that the first-price mechanism based on the welfare maximizing allocation rule OPT is (λ, µ)-smooth.
If the critical prices τi( · | y) are non-decreasing in y then setting pi(1 | y) = max{vi, τi(v-i | y)}
and pi(0 | y) = 0 is (1,
µ+1+λ
λ )-balanced with respect to OPT and the canonical exchange-feasible
sets (Fx)x∈X .
Proof. Fix any y and x ∈ Fy. Observe that by definition of the prices, it holds that
pi(xi | y) ≥ v(OPT(v,F(∅,y−i)))− v(OPT(v,F(xi,y−i))). (5)
To see this, first note that both sides of the inequality are equal to 0 if xi = 0. If xi = 1 and
vi ≥ τi(v-i | y), then agent i is allocated in OPT(v,F(∅,y−i)) and hence both sides of the inequality
are equal to vi. If xi = 1 and vi < τi(v-i | y), then agent i is not allocated in OPT(v,F(∅,y−i)),
and hence the right-hand side of the inequality is at most the externality imposed by forcing an
allocation to agent i, which is at most τi(v-i | y) = pi(xi | y).
We are now ready to prove balancedness. To verify Condition (a), choose x ∈ F and note that
n∑
i=1
pi(xi | x[i−1]) ≥
n∑
i=1
(
v(OPT(v,Fx[i−1]))− v(OPT(v,Fx[i]))
)
= v(OPT(v)) − v(OPT(v,Fx))
as required, where the inequality follows from Equation (5), and the equality follows by a telescoping
sum. For Condition (b), we get
∑
i∈x′
τi(v-i | x[i−1]) ≤
∑
i∈x′
τi(v-i | x) ≤
µ+ 1
λ
v(OPT(v,Fx)), (6)
where the first inequality follows by the monotonicity of critical prices, and the second inequality
follows by a known implication of smoothness [19] (see Appendix I.1). Therefore, for any x′ ∈ Fx,∑
i
pi(x
′
i | x[i−1]) ≤
∑
i∈x′
vi +
∑
i∈x′
τi(v-i | x[i−1])
≤ v(x′) +
µ+ 1
λ
v(OPT(v,Fx))
≤
µ+ 1 + λ
λ
v(OPT(v,Fx)),
where the first inequality follows by replacing the maximum in the definition of the prices by a
sum, the second inequality follows by Equation (6), and the last inequality follows by v(x′) ≤
v(OPT(v,Fx)), since x
′ ∈ Fx.
8The critical price τi(v-i | y) is the infimum of values vi such that the mechanism allocates 1 to agent i on input
(vi,v-i), in the problem subinstance induced by y.
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5.2 General Problems and Outcome Smoothness
We proceed to show an implication from smoothness to prices that works in more general settings.
It is based on the observation that many smoothness proofs proceed by showing that agent i could
bid b′i to get some target outcome x
∗
i . We capture proofs that proceed in this manner through the
following notion of outcome smoothness. Similar but different notions were considered in [16, 40].
Definition 5.2. A mechanism is (λ, µ)-outcome smooth for λ, µ ≥ 0 if for all valuation profiles
v ∈ V there exists an outcome x′(v) ∈ F such that for all bid profiles b ∈ B,
∑
i∈N
(
vi(x
′
i)− inf
b′i: fi(b
′
i,b-i)x
′
i
Pi(b
′
i,b-i)
)
≥ λ · v(OPT(v)) − µ ·
∑
i∈N
Pi(b).
We show that if a first-price, declared welfare maximizing mechanism (i.e., a mechanism with
allocation rule f(b) = OPT(b)) is (λ, µ)-outcome smooth and has non-decreasing critical prices,
then the critical prices for that mechanism (from the definition of outcome smoothness) can be
used as posted prices that yield an O(λ/µ) approximation to the optimal welfare. Recall that these
critical prices are different from the first-price payments that make up the mechanism’s payment
rule. This result has a mild technical caveat: we require that the mechanism continues to be smooth
in a modified problem with multiple copies of each bidders. An allocation is feasible in the modified
feasibility space F ′ if it corresponds to a feasible allocation x ∈ F , with each xi being partitioned
between the copies of agent i.
Theorem 5.2. Fix valuation space V and feasibility space F , and suppose F ′ is an extension of F
as defined above. Suppose that the first-price mechanism based on the declared welfare maximizing
allocation rule for valuation space V and feasibility space F ′ has non-decreasing critical prices,
and is (λ, µ)-outcome smooth for every F ′/z. Then there is a collection of exchange-feasible sets
(Fx)x∈X , and an allocation rule ALG that returns the welfare-maximization allocation with proba-
bility λ, such that for every v ∈ V there exists a pricing rule that is (λ, µ/λ)-balanced with respect
to ALG and (Fx)x∈X .
Theorem 5.2 implies that posting (an appropriately scaled version of) the critical prices from
the outcome smooth mechanism yields a welfare approximation of O(λ/µ), matching the Price of
Anarchy guarantee of the original mechanism. The proof of Theorem 5.2 appears in Appendix H.
5.3 Binary, Single-Parameter Problems
We conclude with two general “black-box reductions” for binary single-parameter settings, in which
agents can either win or lose, which show how to translate PoA guarantees of O(γ) provable via
(regular) smoothness into O(γ2)-approximate posted-price mechanisms. Proofs appear in Appendix
I. The key to both these results is a novel, purely combinatorial implication of smoothness for the
greedy allocation rule proved in Lemma I.2.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose that the first-price mechanism based on the greedy allocation rule GRD
has a Price of Anarchy of O(γ) provable via smoothness, then there exists a O(γ2)-approximate
price-based prophet inequality.
Theorem 5.4. Suppose that the first-price mechanism based on the declared welfare maximizing
allocation rule OPT has a Price of Anarchy of O(γ) provable via smoothness, then there exists a
O(γ2)-approximate price-based prophet inequality.
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We note that Theorem 5.1 applied to matroids (using known smoothness results for pay-your-
bid greedy mechanisms over matroids [39]) implies the existence of (1, 3)-balanced prices and hence
a 4-approximate prophet inequality. A strengthening of Theorem 5.4 for monotonically increasing
critical prices (discussed in Remark I.2) leads to an improved factor of 2, matching the prophet
inequality for matroids shown in Kleinberg and Weinberg [33]. This also captures the classic single-
item prophet inequality, as a special case.
6 Conclusions and Open Problems
We introduced a general framework for establishing prophet inequalities and posted price mecha-
nisms for multi-dimensional settings. This work leaves many questions open.
A general class of questions is to determine the best approximation guarantee that a prophet
inequality can achieve for a particular setting. For example, even for the intersection of two matroids
there is a gap between the trivial lower bound of 2 and the upper bound of 4k − 2 = 6. Similarly,
in subadditive combinatorial auctions, the best-known upper bound is logarithmic in the number
of items m [23], but again the best-known lower bound is 2, inherited from the case of a single
item. Notably, the price of anarchy for simultaneous single-item auctions is known to be constant
for subadditive valuations [22], but the proof does not use the smoothness framework and hence
our results relating posted prices to smooth mechanisms do not directly apply.
A related question is whether there exist prophet inequalities that cannot be implemented
using posted prices. Interestingly, we are not aware of any separation between the two so far.
More generally, one could ask about the power of anonymous versus personalized prices, item
versus bundle prices, static versus dynamic prices, and so on. For example, to what extent can
static prices approximate the welfare under a matroid constraint, an intersection of matroids, or
an arbitrary downward-closed feasibility constraint?
Regarding the pricing framework itself, it would be interesting to extend the notion of (α, β)-
balancedness to allow randomization in a dynamic pricing rule, and to understand the additional
power of randomization. One could also generalize beyond feasibility constraints to more general
seller-side costs for allocations. For the connection between smoothness and balancedness, we leave
open the question of removing the price-monotonicity condition from Theorem 5.2, or whether the
approximation factors can be improved for our single-parameter reductions (Theorems 5.3 and 5.4).
Finally, recent work has shown that smoothness guarantees often improve as markets grow large [25];
is there a corresponding result for balancedness?
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A Classic Prophet Inequality via Balanced Prices
In this appendix we show how to re-derive the classic prophet inequality via our framework in
Section 3. Specifically, we show the existence of a (1, 1)-balanced pricing rule as defined in Definition
3.1. Theorem 3.1 then shows the factor 2-approximation.
In the classic setting we have Xi = {0, 1} for all i and F = {x |
∑
i xi ≤ 1}. We set pi(1 | x) =
maxℓ vℓ if x does not allocate the item, ∞ otherwise; pi(0 | x) = 0 for all x. This corresponds to a
fixed posted price of maxℓ vℓ on the item.
Claim A.1. These prices are (1, 1)-balanced with respect to OPT and Fx defined by Fx = F if x
does not allocate the item and Fx = ∅ otherwise.
Proof. Let x be an arbitrary allocation profile. If x allocates the item, then Fx = ∅ and thus
Condition (b) is trivially fulfilled. For Condition (a), we observe that v(OPT(v,Fx)) = 0 and that
v(OPT(v)) = maxℓ vℓ =
∑
i pi(xi | x[i−1]), because exactly one buyer pays maxℓ vℓ. If x does not
allocate the item, then v(OPT(v,Fx)) = v(OPT(v)), making Condition (a) trivial. For Condition
(b), we use that in x′ at most one buyer is allocated the item. Therefore,
∑
i pi(x
′
i | x[i−1]) ≤
maxℓ vℓ = v(OPT(v)) = v(OPT(v,Fx)).
B Proof of Theorem 3.2
Our proof will follow the same steps as the one for Theorem 3.1. As in that poof, denote the
exchange-compatible family of sets with respect to which the collection of pricing rules (pv)v∈V is
balanced by (Fx)x∈X , and let x(v) be the allocation returned by the posted-price mechanism on
input valuation profile v. Let x′(v,v′) = OPT(v′,Fx(v)) be the allocation that maximizes welfare
with respect to valuation profile v′ over feasibility constraint Fx(v).
Utility bound: Again sample valuations v′ ∼ D. By the same reasoning as in the proof of
Theorem 3.1, we obtain
E
v
[∑
i∈N
ui(v)
]
= E
v,v′
[
v′(x′(v,v′))
]
− E
v,v′
[∑
i∈N
δ · pi
(
x′i(v,v
′)
∣∣∣∣ x[i−1](v)
)]
. (7)
We upper bound the last term in the previous inequality by using Property (b). This gives pointwise
for any v and v′
∑
i∈N
δ · pi
(
x′i(v,v
′)
∣∣∣∣ x[i−1](v)
)
≤ δβ1 · E
v˜
[
v˜(OPT(v˜,Fx(v)))
]
+ δβ2 · E
v˜
[v˜(ALG(v˜))] ,
and therefore also
E
v,v′
[∑
i∈N
δ · pi
(
x′i(v,v
′)
∣∣∣∣ x[i−1](v)
)]
≤ δβ1 · E
v,v˜
[
v˜(OPT(v˜,Fx(v))
]
+ δβ2 · E
v,v˜
[v˜(ALG(v˜)] . (8)
Replacing v′ with v˜ in Inequality (7) and combining it with Inequality (8) we obtain
E
v
[∑
i∈N
ui(v)
]
≥ (1− δβ1) · E
v,v˜
[
v˜(OPT(v˜,Fx(v))
]
− δβ2 · E
v,v˜
[v˜(ALG(v˜)] . (9)
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Revenue bound: Again, applying Property (a) we obtain
E
v
[∑
i∈N
δ · pi(xi(v) | x[i−1](v))
]
≥
δ
α
· E
v˜
[v˜(ALG(v˜))]−
δ
α
· E
v˜,v
[
v˜(OPT(v˜,Fx(v))
]
. (10)
Combination: To combine our bounds, we distinguish whether β2 ≥
1
2α .
Case 1: β2 ≥
1
2α We use that point-wise for every i ∈ N we have ui(v) ≥ 0. Therefore, ui(v) ≥
ρui(v) for all 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Using δ =
1
β1+2β2
, ρ = 12αβ2 , and Inequalities (9) and (10), we get
E
v
[∑
i∈N
vi(xi(v))
]
≥ ρ · E
v
[∑
i∈N
ui(v)
]
+ E
v
[∑
i∈N
δ · pi
(
xi(v) | x[i−1](v)
)]
≥ ρ(1− δβ1) · E
v,v˜
[
v˜(OPT(v˜,Fx(v))
]
− ρδβ2 · E
v,v˜
[v˜(ALG(v˜)]
+
δ
α
· E
v˜
[v˜(ALG(v˜))]−
δ
α
· E
v˜,v
[
v˜(OPT(v˜,Fx(v))
]
=
1
α(2β1 + 4β2)
· E
v˜
[v˜(ALG(v˜)] .
Case 2: β2 <
1
2α Now, we use δ =
1
β1+1/α
. Inequalities (9) and (10) yield
E
v
[∑
i∈N
vi(xi(v))
]
≥ E
v
[∑
i∈N
ui(v)
]
+ E
v
[∑
i∈N
δ · pi
(
xi(v) | x[i−1](v)
)]
≥ (1− δβ1) · E
v,v˜
[
v˜(OPT(v˜,Fx(v))
]
− δβ2 · E
v,v˜
[v˜(ALG(v˜)]
+
δ
α
· E
v˜
[v˜(ALG(v˜))]−
δ
α
· E
v˜,v
[
v˜(OPT(v˜,Fx(v))
]
=
1− αβ2
1 + αβ1
· E
v˜
[v˜(ALG(v˜)]
≥
1
α(2β1 + 4β2)
E
v˜
[v˜(ALG(v˜)] ,
where the last step uses that β1 + β2 ≥
1
α and β2 <
1
2α .
C Composition Results
In this section we show that balanced prices are composable, in the sense that balanced prices
for separate markets remain balanced when the markets are combined. We consider two forms of
composition. The first is a composition of preferences: it shows how to extend from a class of
valuations V to any maximum over valuations from V . The second shows how to compose allo-
cations across different markets, where agents have additive preferences across markets. Together
these two composition results capture XOS composition, in the sense of [45]. Our theorems apply
to balancedness with respect to OPT, and they extend to general approximation algorithms ALG
under mild conditions.
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Closure under Maximum Given an arbitrary valuation space Vi for player i, we consider
its extension V maxi , which contains all functions v
max
i : Xi → R for which there is a finite set
{v1i , . . . , v
m
i } ∈ Vi such that v
max
i (xi) = maxℓ v
ℓ
i (xi) for all xi ∈ Xi. We say that a valuation profile
v˜ ∈ V is a supporting valuation profile for allocation x and valuation profile v ∈ V max if v˜i ≤ vi
and v˜i(xi) = vi(xi) for all i.
Definition C.1. Allocation rule ALG is consistent if for every v ∈ V max and corresponding sup-
porting valuation profile v˜ ∈ V for ALG(v), we have v˜(ALG(v˜)) ≥ v˜(ALG(v)).
Lemma C.1. The optimal allocation rule OPT is consistent.
Proof. Since OPT(v) is a feasible outcome under v˜, it holds that v˜(OPT(v˜)) ≥ v˜(OPT(v)) by
optimality.
Theorem C.1. Suppose that for each v ∈ V there exists a pricing rule pv that is (α, β)-balanced
with respect to v, consistent allocation rule ALG, and the exchange-compatible family of sets (Fx)x∈X .
For each v ∈ V max let v˜ ∈ V be a supporting valuation profile for ALG(v). Then the pricing rule
pv˜ is (α, β)-balanced with respect to v, ALG, and (Fx)x∈X .
Proof. We first establish Property (a). We use Property (a) of the original pricing rules, plus the
definition of a supporting valuation profile to conclude that
∑
i∈N
pv˜i (xi | x[i−1]) ≥
1
α
· (v˜(ALG(v˜))− v˜(OPT(v˜,Fx))
≥
1
α
·
(
v˜(ALG(v)) − v(OPT(v˜,Fx)
)
≥
1
α
·
(
v(ALG(v)) − v(OPT(v,Fx)
)
.
Next we establish Property (b). By Property (b) of the original pricing rule and the definition
of a supporting valuation profile,∑
i∈N
pv˜i (x
′
i | x[i−1]) ≤ β · v˜(OPT(v˜,Fx))
≤ β · v(OPT(v˜,Fx))
≤ β · v(OPT(v,Fx)).
Closure under Addition Suppose there are m separate allocation problems, each with feasibil-
ity constraint Fℓ over allocation space Xℓ = Xℓ1× . . .×X
ℓ
n. The joint problem is then defined over
the product allocation space X = X1× . . .×Xm, with feasibility constraint F = F1× . . .×Fm. We
say that a valuation vi : X → R is additive if it is defined by a (not necessarily additive) valuation
function vℓi for each outcome x
ℓ
i ∈ X
ℓ
i , and for an outcome xi = (x
1
i , . . . , x
m
i ) ∈ Xi, the value of xi
is given by vi(xi) =
∑m
ℓ=1 v
ℓ
i (x
ℓ
i).
Theorem C.2. Suppose that v is additive over a set of allocation problems F1, . . . ,Fm, and
for each individual allocation problem there exists a pricing rule pv
ℓ
that is (α, β)-balanced with
respect to vℓ, allocation rule ALGℓ on Fℓ, and the exchange-compatible family of sets (Fℓ
xℓ
)xℓ∈Xℓ.
Then the pricing rule p =
∑m
ℓ=1 p
vℓ is (α, β)-balanced with respect to v and ALG on F , where
ALG(v) = (ALG1(v1), . . . ,ALGm(vm)).
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Proof. Set Fx = (
∏m
i=1 F
ℓ
xℓ
)x∈X . We first verify Condition (a). We use the definition of the
joint pricing rule, Condition (a) of the component pricing rules together with additivity across
subproblems to conclude that
∑
i∈N
pi(xi | x[i−1]) =
∑
i∈N
m∑
ℓ=1
pv
ℓ
i (x
ℓ
i | x
ℓ
[i−1])
≥
m∑
ℓ=1
1
α
·
(
vℓ(ALGℓ(vℓ))− vℓ(OPT(vℓ,Fxℓ)
)
=
1
α
· (v(ALG(v)) − v(OPT(v,Fx))) .
Next we verify Condition (b). We use the definition of the joint pricing rule, Condition (b) of
the component pricing rules together with additivity across subproblems to conclude that
∑
i∈N
pi(x
′
i | x[i−1]) =
m∑
ℓ=1
∑
i∈N
pv
ℓ
i ((x
′)ℓi | x
ℓ
[i−1])
≤
m∑
ℓ=1
β · vℓ(OPT(vℓ,Fxℓ))
= β · v(OPT(v,Fx)).
We note that both Theorem C.1 and Theorem C.2 can be generalized so that they apply to
weakly balanced pricing rules.
D Proof of Theorem 1.1
In this appendix we establish our new prophet inequality results for combinatorial auctions with
MPH-k valuations. In particular, we establish the existence of (1, 1)-balanced prices for XOS
combinatorial auctions.
Combinatorial Auctions with MPH-k Valuations The maximum over positive hypergraphs
(MPH) hierarchy of valuations [21] is an inclusive hierarchy (i.e., it is expressive enough to include
all valuations), which subsumes many interesting classes of valuations as special cases.
To formalize this valuation class, we first need a few preliminaries. A hypergraph representation
w of valuation function v : 2M → R≥0 is a set function that satisfies v(S) =
∑
T⊆S w(T ). Any
valuation function v admits a unique hypergraph representation and vice versa. A set S such that
w(S) 6= 0 is said to be a hyperedge of w. Pictorially, the hypergraph representation can be thought
as a weighted hypergraph, where every vertex is associated with an item in M , and the weight of
each hyperedge e ⊆ M is w(e). Then the value of the function for any set S ⊆ M , is the total
value of all hyperedges that are contained in S. The rank of a hypergraph representation w is the
cardinality k of the largest hyperedge. The rank of v is the rank of its corresponding w and we refer
to a valuation function v with rank k as a hypergraph-k valuation. If the hypergraph representation
of v is non-negative, i.e. for any S ⊆ M , w(S) ≥ 0, then we refer to function v as a positive
hypergraph-k function (PH-k) [2].
Definition D.1 (Maximum Over Positive Hypergraph-k (MPH-k) class [21]). A monotone valua-
tion function v : 2M → R≥0 isMaximum over Positive Hypergraph-k (MPH-k) if it can be expressed
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as a maximum over a set of PH-k functions. That is, there exist PH-k functions {vℓ}ℓ∈L such that
for every set S ⊆M ,
v(S) = maxℓ∈L vℓ(S), (11)
where L is an arbitrary index set.
An important special case of MPH-k are XOS valuations, which are defined as the maximum
over additive functions, and therefore coincide with MPH-1.
Existential O(k) Result Given an arbitrary allocation algorithm ALG and valuation profile
v, write v˜ for the supporting Hypergraph-k valuations for allocation ALG(v). Write wi for the
hypergraph representation of v˜i, so that v˜i(ALG(v)) =
∑
T⊆ALGi(v)
wi(T ).
Then, for each item j, we define
pv({j}) =
∑
T∋j
T⊆ALGi(v)
wi(T ). (12)
That is, item prices are determined by adding up the weights of each supporting hyperedges an
item is contained in. These prices then extend linearly: For each set of goods x, set pv(x) =∑
j∈x p
v({j}). Finally, for each agent i and allocation xi, we will have p
v
i (xi | z) = p
v(xi) whenever
xi is disjoint from the sets in z and ∞ otherwise.
Theorem D.1. The pricing rule defined in Equation 12, extended linearly to sets of items, is
weakly (1, 1, k − 1)-balanced with respect to an arbitrary allocation rule ALG and MPH-k valuation
profile v.
Proof. We will show balancedness with respect to Fx = {y ∈ F : (
⋃
i yi) ∩ (
⋃
i xi) = ∅}. Observe
that we can lower-bound the value of OPT(v,Fx) by removing all items that are allocated by x
from the allocation ALG(v). This gives us
v(OPT(v,Fx)) ≥
∑
ℓ∈N
vℓ(ALGℓ(v) \ (
⋃
i
xi)) ≥
∑
ℓ
∑
T⊆ALGℓ(v)
∀i : T∩xi=∅
wℓ(T ). (13)
Furthermore, note first that pv is a fixed pricing scheme, meaning that the price of an outcome
does not change unless it becomes infeasible. Therefore, for every allocation y ∈ Fx, we have∑
i
pi(yi | x[i−1]) =
∑
i
pi(yi | x)
=
∑
i
∑
j∈yi
pv({j})
=
∑
i
∑
ℓ
∑
j∈ALGℓ(v)∩yi
pv({j})
=
∑
ℓ
∑
i
∑
j∈ALGℓ(v)∩yi
∑
T∋j
T⊆ALGℓ(v)
wℓ(T ). (14)
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For condition (a), by Equation (14),∑
i
pvi (xi | x[i−1]) ≥
∑
ℓ
∑
T⊆ALGℓ(v)
∃i : T∩xi 6=∅
wℓ(T )
=
(∑
ℓ
∑
T⊆ALGℓ(v)
wℓ(T )−
∑
ℓ
∑
T⊆ALGℓ(v)
∀i : T∩xi=∅
wℓ(T )
)
≥ (v(ALG(v)) − v(OPT(v,Fx))),
where the first inequality follows by changing the order of summation over j and T , and the second
inequality is given in Equation 13.
For condition (b), note that for all x and all x′ ∈ Fx, by Equation (14), after splitting the sum
depending on whether the respective set T intersects with any of the bundles in x or not∑
i
pi(x
′
i | x[i−1]) =
∑
ℓ
∑
i
∑
j∈ALGℓ(v)∩x
′
i
∑
T∋j
T⊆ALGℓ(v)
T∩(
⋃
i′ xi′)=∅
wℓ(T ) +
∑
ℓ
∑
i
∑
j∈ALGℓ(v)∩x
′
i
∑
T∋j
T⊆ALGℓ(v)
T∩(
⋃
i′ xi′ )6=∅
wℓ(T ).
Observe that in the first sum for a fixed set T , the term wℓ(T ) occurs at most |T | times. In the
second sum, it can even occur only |T | − 1 times because the intersection of x and x′ is empty but
x intersects with T . By applying that |T | ≤ k whenever wℓ(T ) > 0, this gives us∑
i
pi(x
′
i | x[i−1]) ≤
∑
ℓ
∑
T⊆ALGℓ(v)
T∩(
⋃
i′ xi′ )=∅
|T |wℓ(T ) +
∑
ℓ
∑
T⊆ALGℓ(v)
T∩(
⋃
i′ xi′)6=∅
(|T | − 1)wℓ(T )
≤ k
∑
ℓ
∑
T⊆ALGℓ(v)
T∩(
⋃
i′ xi′)=∅
wℓ(T ) + (k − 1)
∑
ℓ
∑
T⊆ALGℓ(v)
T∩(
⋃
i′ xi′ )6=∅
wℓ(T )
=
∑
ℓ
∑
T⊆ALGℓ(v)
T∩(
⋃
i′ xi′ )=∅
wℓ(T ) + (k − 1)
∑
ℓ
∑
T⊆ALGℓ(v)
wℓ(T )
≥ v(OPT(v,Fx)) + (k − 1)v(ALG(v)).
Note that Theorem D.1 when specialized to XOS valuations shows the existence of weakly
(1, 1, 0)-balanced prices, or equivalently, (1, 1)-balanced prices.
Computational O(k) Result We now show how to obtain a polytime (4k − 2)-approximate
price-based prophet inequality for MPH-k valuations. For this result we will assume access to the
following kind of MPH-k oracle. Suppose that valuation function v is MPH-k, with supporting
PH-k functions {vℓ}ℓ∈L. The query for v takes as input a set of items S, and returns a value oracle
to access the PH-k function vℓ for which v(S) = vℓ(S). That is, for every T ⊆ M , we can query
the value of vℓ(T ) in a second step.
The following linear problem, known as the configuration LP for combinatorial auctions, com-
putes a fractional allocation that maximizes the social welfare among all fractional allocations.
25
max
∑
i,S
vi(S) · xi,S
s.t.
∑
S
x
i,S
≤ 1 for every i ∈ N
∑
i,S:j∈S
x
i,S
≤ 1 for every j ∈M
x
i,S
∈ [0, 1] for every i ∈ N,S ⊆M
We extend the definition of F to include all fractional allocations that fulfill the above LP; Fx
is extended to all fractional allocations that use at most a fractional equivalent of 1−
∑
i,S:j∈S xi,S
of every item j ∈M . Our first observation will be that Theorem D.1 holds even for the fractional
version of the MPH-k combinatorial auction problem. That is, if the set of feasible outcomes is
extended to include all fractional allocations, then an appropriate extension of the prices described
above remain weakly (1, 1, k − 1)-balanced. In particular, given a fixed valuation profile v, we
define prices based on the optimal LP solution x∗. For every agent i and every bundle S, let
wi,S be the PH-k representation in the support that maximizes agent i’s valuation of S, which is
vi(S) =
∑
T⊆S wi,S(T ). Then, price item j as follows: p({j}) =
∑
i
∑
S x
∗
i,S
∑
T :j∈T,T⊆S wi,S(T ) =∑
i
∑
S x
∗
i,S(wi,S(S) − wi,S(S \ {j})). This sum can be computed in polynomial time given oracle
access as described above because x∗i,S 6= 0 only for polynomially many S. Then, extend this pricing
linearly to prices over sets of items, and to prices over fractional allocations by simple scaling, i.e.,
for every x ∈ F and x′ ∈ Fx, we let p(x
′
i | x) =
∑
S x
′
i,S
∑
j∈S p({j}).
It is well known that an optimal fractional solution to the configuration LP can be computed in
polynomial time given access to demand queries (using demand queries to implement a separation
oracle, as is standard). Therefore, for the space of fractional allocations, prices that are weakly
(1, 1, k−1)-balanced with respect to the optimal fractional solution can be computed in polynomial
time, given access to demand and MPH-k oracles.
We can therefore compute prices that give a (4k − 2)-approximation to the optimal fractional
allocation, in a posted price mechanism, where agents are free to purchase any fractional allocation
at the posted prices. This, however, seems unsatisfactory. After all, we do not wish to allow agents
to purchase infeasible sets, and the analysis only applies if every agent can purchase a set in her
demand correspondence. The following observation comes to our help: for every agent i, if all
previous agents have selected integral outcomes from the posted price mechanism, then agent i has
a utility-maximizing outcome in their demand correspondence that is integral. This is because any
fractional allocation can be interpreted as a convex combination of integral allocations. Since our
approximation guarantee holds regardless of the demanded set chosen by each agent, it will hold
even if we restrict agents to only select integral outcomes in the posted price mechanism. This
means that we only need to price integral allocations and the analysis follows. We conclude that
the prices computed using the configuration LP, as described above, actually generate a (4k − 2)
approximation for the (non-fractional) MPH-k combinatorial auction problem.
E Proof of Theorem 1.3
In this appendix we prove our polytime price-based prophet inequalities for sparse linear packing
programs. We consider programs with and without integrality constraints. That is, the possible
outcomes for agent i are either [0, 1] (fractional solutions) or {0, 1} (integral solutions). We assume
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that valuations are linear, i.e., vi(xi) = vi · xi. In both cases, the feasibility constraints F are given
by a constraint matrix A ∈ Rm×n≥0 such that x ∈ F if and only if A · x ≤ c. Without loss of
generality, let cj = 1 for all j ∈ [m].
We assume that aj,i ≤
1
2 for all i, j and that the column sparsity is bounded by d, meaning that
for each i there are at most d choices of j such that aj,i > 0.
Theorem E.1. For d-sparse linear packing programs with constraint matrix A ∈ Rm×n≥0 such that
aj,i ≤
1
2 for all i, j and unit capacities, there exist weakly (1, 0, d)- and (2, 0, d)-balanced prices, for
fractional and integral solutions, respectively, with respect to arbitrary allocation algorithms ALG.
The prices can be computed by running ALG once.
We will define static prices pi(xi | y) as follows. Let x
∗ = ALG(v). For each constraint j, we
define a per-unit price ρj by setting ρj =
∑
i∈N :aj,i>0
vix
∗
i . Now, we define pi(xi | y) =
∑
j aj,ixiρj
for every quantity xi that can feasibly be added to y. The claim will now follow by the two lemmas
below.
Lemma E.1. For F being all fractional solutions, the devised pricing scheme is weakly (1, 0, d)-
balanced with respect to ALG.
Proof. Let Fx = {z | A(x + z) ≤ 1}. To verify Condition (a), we derive a lower bound on
v(OPT(v,Fx)) as follows. Given x, let z be defined by setting zi = x
∗
i (1−maxj:aj,i>0
∑
i′ aj,i′xi′).
We have z ∈ Fx because for every constraint j we have∑
i
aj,ixi +
∑
i
aj,izi ≤
∑
i
aj,ixi +
∑
i
aj,ix
∗
i (1−
∑
i′
aj,i′xi′) ≤ 1.
Note that furthermore, by this definition, x∗i′(
∑
i aj,ixi) ≥ x
∗
i′ − zi′ for all i
′ and all j.
Now, it follows that ∑
i
pi(xi | x[i−1]) =
∑
i
∑
j
aj,ixiρj
=
∑
i
∑
j
aj,ixi
∑
i′:aj,i′>0
vi′x
∗
i′
=
∑
j
∑
i′:aj,i′>0
vi′x
∗
i′(
∑
i
aj,ixi)
≥
∑
j
∑
i′:aj,i′>0
vi′(x
∗
i′ − zi′)
≥
∑
i′
vi′(x
∗
i′ − zi′)
≥ v(ALG(v)) − v(OPT(v,Fx)).
For Condition (b), we simply observe that∑
i
pi(x
′
i | x[i−1]) =
∑
i
∑
j
aj,ix
′
iρj
=
∑
j
ρj
∑
j
aj,ix
′
i
≤
∑
j
ρj
27
=
∑
j
∑
i∈N :aj,i>0
vix
∗
i
=
∑
i
∑
j:aj,i>0
vix
∗
i
≤ d
∑
i
vix
∗
i = d · v(ALG(v)).
Lemma E.2. For F being all integral solutions, the devised pricing scheme is weakly (2, 0, d)-
balanced with respect to ALG.
Proof. To define Fx, let c be the vector such that cj = 1 if
∑
i aj,ixi ≤
1
2 and cj = 0 otherwise.
That is, cj = 1 if and only if constraint j still has capacity at least
1
2 after adding x. Let Fx be the
set of integral solutions y that fulfill Ay ≤ c.
Let z be defined such that zi = x
∗
i if
∑
i′ aj,i′xi′ ≤
1
2 for all j with aj,i > 0 and let zi = 0
otherwise. By this definition, we have zi ≥ x
∗
i (1 − 2maxj:aj,i>0
∑
i′ aj,i′xi′). For this reason,
x∗i′(
∑
i aj,ixi) ≥
1
2(x
∗
i′ − zi′) for all i
′ and all j.
From here on, we can follow the exact same calculations as above. For Condition (a), we have∑
i
pi(xi | x[i−1]) =
∑
i
∑
j
aj,ixiρj
=
∑
i
∑
j
aj,ixi
∑
i′:aj,i′>0
vi′x
∗
i′
=
∑
j
∑
i′:aj,i′>0
vi′x
∗
i′(
∑
i
aj,ixi)
≥
∑
j
∑
i′:aj,i′>0
vi′
1
2
(x∗i′ − zi′)
≥
1
2
∑
i′
vi′(x
∗
i′ − zi′)
≥
1
2
(
v(ALG(v)) − v(OPT(v,Fx))
)
.
For Condition (b), we observe that again∑
i
pi(x
′
i | x[i−1]) =
∑
i
∑
j
aj,ix
′
iρj
=
∑
j
ρj
∑
j
aj,ix
′
i ≤
∑
j
ρj
=
∑
j
∑
i∈N :aj,i>0
vix
∗
i
=
∑
i
∑
j:aj,i>0
vix
∗
i
≤ d
∑
i
vix
∗
i = d · v(ALG(v)).
Pricing Integral Problems based on Fractional Solutions The way we described the pric-
ing schemes above was to use an offline allocation algorithm ALG for the respective problem. This
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algorithm has to solve an NP-hard problem and as we show any approximation guarantee is pre-
served in the process. However, it is also possible to use the respective optimal fractional solution
instead of ALG. The pricing schemes defined this way then achieve the described approximation
guarantees with respect to the fractional optimum. To show this result, we have to slightly ex-
tend our framework and allow Fx to contain distributions over outcome profiles that are exchange
compatible.
Specifically, for the integral part of Theorem E.1 we would define Fx as the set of distributions
such that the expected consumption in the jth constraint is at most 1 if
∑
i aj,ixi ≤
1
2 and 0
otherwise. Note that this extends the definition of Fx in the proof of Lemma E.2 to distributions.
Following the steps above, z is now randomized based on the optimal fractional solution x∗. We
let zi = 1 with probability x
∗
i if
∑
i′ aj,i′xi′ ≤
1
2 for all j with aj,i > 0 and let zi = 0 otherwise. In
the remainder, zi′ is replaced by its expectation.
F Proof of Theorem 1.4
We consider a matroid feasibility constraint M = (E,I), where E is a ground set of elements and
I ⊆ 2E is a family of feasible subsets. Set E is partitioned into subsets E1, . . . , En, corresponding
to agents, and for each i, the outcome space Xi contains all subsets of Ei. One can think of Ei
as the set of elements from which agent i can choose. An allocation x is feasible if and only if⋃
i xi ∈ I; that is, if the chosen elements form an independent set.
9 Given a valuation profile
v, let OPT(v) ∈ I denote a social-welfare maximizing allocation. Furthermore, given S ∈ I, let
OPT(v | S) denote the set T ∈ I maximizing v(T ) such that S ∩ T = ∅ and S ∪ T ∈ I. Theorem
F.1 asserts the existence of balanced prices for matroid settings with additive, submodular, and
XOS valuations.
Theorem F.1. There exist prices for multi-dimensional matroid settings in which agents have
additive, submodular, or XOS valuations that are (1, 1)-balanced with respect to OPT.
As a special case, we obtain (1, 1)-balanced prices for the single-dimensional matroid setting of
[33], where each agent controls exactly one element of the ground set.
We prove the theorem for additive valuations. That is, there are non-negative numbers vi,j such
that vi(xi) =
∑
j∈xi
vi,j . The proof for submodular and XOS Valuations then follows directly from
Theorem C.1 (composition theorem: closure under maximum).
Additive Valuations Given S ∈ I, i ∈ N , and a valuation profile v, define
pvi (xi | y) =
{
v(OPT(v |
⋃
j yj))− v(OPT(v | (
⋃
j yj ∪ xi))) , if (
⋃
j yj ∪ xi) ∈ I
∞ , otherwise.
(15)
The following lemma shows that the prices in Equation 15 are monotonically increasing. We
then prove in Theorem F.2 that these prices are (1, 1)-balanced.
Lemma F.1. Consider the pricing rule pv. For an arbitrary profile v, feasible outcome profiles
y,y′ ∈ F such that yj ⊆ y
′
j for all j, agent i, and allocation xi,
pvi (xi | y) ≤ p
v
i (xi | y
′).
9Kleinberg and Weinberg [33] also provide bounds for a multi-dimensional matroid setting. Their result, which
has implications for revenue and welfare, applies when buyers have unit-demand preferences with independent values
across elements. Our approach is different, and provides a welfare bound for a broader class of valuations.
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Proof. Let S =
⋃
j yj, T =
⋃
j y
′
j. If S∪xi 6∈ I, then T ∪xi 6∈ I, and so p
v
i (xi | y) = p
v
i (xi | y
′) =∞.
Otherwise,
pvi (xi | y) = v(OPT(v | S))− v(OPT(v | (S ∪ xi)))
≤ v(OPT(v | T ))− v(OPT(v | (T ∪ xi)))
≤ pvi (xi | y
′),
where the equation follows by the definition of pvi (xi | y), and the inequality follows from the
submodularity of the function f(U) = v(OPT(v | U)) (cf. [32, Lemma 3]).
Theorem F.2. The pricing rule defined in Equation 15 is (1, 1)-balanced with respect to the optimal
allocation rule OPT.
Proof. We define Fx as the set of all outcome profiles y ∈ E1 × . . .×En such (
⋃
i yi) ∩ (
⋃
i xi) = ∅
and (
⋃
i yi) ∪ (
⋃
i xi) ∈ I. In other words, we consider the matroid contracted by the set
⋃
i xi.
We first show that Condition (a) holds for α = 1. For every agent i ∈ N and every x ∈ F by a
telescoping-sum argument,
∑
i
pvi (xi | x[i−1]) =
∑
i

v(OPT(v | i−1⋃
j=1
xj))− v(OPT(v |
i⋃
j=1
xj))


= v(OPT(v)) − v(OPT(v |
⋃
j
xj))
= v(OPT(v)) − v(OPT(v,Fx)).
We next show that the second condition holds for β = 1. Consider some arbitrary x ∈ F ,
x′ ∈ Fx. Let S =
⋃
i xi. Note that OPT(v | S) is precisely a maximum-weight basis of the matroid
contracted with S. By the generalized Rota exchange theorem [36, Lemma 2.7], for each i there
exists some set Ri ⊆ OPT(v | S) (which may not be contained in Ei) such that each element of
OPT(v | S) appears in exactly one Ri, and (OPT(v | S) \ Ri) ∪ x
′
i is an independent set in the
matroid after contracting S. We therefore have∑
i∈N
pvi (x
′
i | x[i−1]) ≤
∑
i∈N
pvi (x
′
i | x)
=
∑
i∈N
[
v(OPT(v | S))− v(OPT(v | S ∪ x′i))
]
≤
∑
i∈N
[
v(OPT(v | S))− v(OPT(v | S) \Ri)
]
=
∑
i∈N
v(Ri)
= v(OPT(v | x)),
where the first inequality follows from the monotonicity of the prices (Lemma F.1), and the second
inequality follows by observing that (OPT(v) \ Ri) ∪ x
′
i is feasible in the contracted matroid (see
the Rota exchange argument above), and thus v(OPT(v) \ Ri) ≤ v(OPT(v | S ∪ x
′
i)). The final
equality follows by additivity. We conclude that the suggested prices are (1, 1)-balanced.
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Computational Aspects Theorem F.1 establishes the existence of a price-based 2-approximate
prophet inequality for additive, submodular, and XOS preferences. For additive valuations the
construction is polytime, as the greedy algorithm is optimal. For submodular and XOS valuations
computing the optimal allocation is NP-hard.
We claim that the result for submodular valuations can turn into a computational one, by
basing the prices on an approximately optimal allocation. Namely, let GRD be the algorithm that
allocates items greedily by value, always choosing the item that locally increases v(x) the most
subject to the matroid constraint. We show that GRD is consistent (see Definition C.1) in this
setting.
Lemma F.2. The greedy algorithm GRD is consistent for XOS valuations over matroid feasibility
constraints.
Proof. Fix an XOS valuation profile v, and let v˜ be a supporting valuation profile for the allocation
GRD(v). Note that as the supporting valuation profile is additive, GRD returns the optimal solution.
As GRD(v) is another feasible solution, we have v˜(GRD(v˜)) ≥ v˜(GRD(v)).
Theorem C.1 (closure under maximum) now implies that the prices given in (15) for an additive
valuation supporting GRD(v) are (1, 1)-balanced with respect to the greedy allocation. We can
compute these prices in polynomial time by simulating GRD and then determining the supporting
additive valuation. Since GRD is a 2-approximation to OPT for submodular valuations, Theorem 3.1
then implies that we can compute prices that yield a 4-approximation to the optimal expected
welfare, less an additive sampling error.
G A Smooth Mechanism Without Good Posted Prices
In this appendix we show that there are allocation problems that admit constant-factor smooth
mechanisms, but for which no posted-price mechanism can guarantee more than a linear fraction
of the optimal social welfare.
Proposition G.1. There exists a downward-closed welfare maximization problem that admits a
(1, 0)-smooth mechanism, but for which any posted price mechanism has approximation factor Ω(n).
Proof. Let k be a positive integer to be fixed later. In the allocation problem we consider, Xi =
[k]n ∪ {∅} for each i ∈ [n]. That is, each agent is allocated either ∅ or a sequence of n integers
between 1 and k. For xi ∈ Xi\{∅}, write xi = (xi1, . . . , xin), where each xij ∈ [k]. The set of
feasible allocations is F = {x : (xi 6= xj) =⇒ ((xi = ∅) ∨ (xj = ∅))}. That is, all agents who
receive a non-empty allocation must receive the same allocation.
Agents have the following valuations. Each agent i has some desired value zi ∈ [k]. The value
of an allocation is vi(xi) = 1 if xii = zi, and vi(xi) = 0 otherwise. Let Di be the distribution over
such valuations in which zi is chosen uniformly from [k].
For this feasibility constraint and space of valuations, consider the mechanism that returns the
welfare-optimal allocation and charges payments of 0. This mechanism simultaneously satisfies all
desires by allocating (z1, . . . , zn) to every agent, where zi is the desired value reported by agent i.
This mechanism is (1, 0)-smooth, with truth-telling being the required deviation.
On the other hand, consider any posted-price mechanism. Whichever is the first agent to obtain
a non-∅ outcome, say agent i purchasing allocation xi, each subsequent agent j can obtain positive
value only if zj = xij , which occurs with probability 1/k. We therefore have that the expected
welfare of any posted price mechanism is at most 1 + n−1k . Taking k = n and noting that the
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optimal welfare is n, we conclude that no posted price mechanism can obtain more than an Ω(n)
approximation to the optimal welfare.
H Proof of Theorem 5.2
To prove Theorem 5.2, we will first introduce the notion of weak outcome smoothness, then
show how to construct the prices, and finally establish the two conditions necessary for (α, β)-
balancedness separately.
H.1 Weak Outcome Smoothness and Its Properties
We begin by defining a more general notion of outcome smoothness, corresponding to the notion
of weak smoothness.
Definition H.1. A mechanism is weakly (λ, µ1, µ2)-outcome smooth for λ, µ1, µ2 ≥ 0 if for all
valuation profiles v ∈ V there exists an outcome x′(v) ∈ F such that for all bid profiles b ∈ B,
∑
i∈N
(
vi(x
′
i)− inf
b′i: fi(b
′
i,b-i)x
′
i
Pi(b
′
i,b-i)
)
≥ λ · v(OPT(v)) − µ1 ·
∑
i∈N
Pi(b)− µ2 · b(f(b)).
The following observation will facilitate our discussion in what follows. Under a mild scale
invariance assumption, we can without loss of generality consider (λ, 0, µ)-outcome smooth mech-
anisms.
Proposition H.1. Consider a (λ, µ1, µ2)-outcome smooth mechanism with allocation rule f and
payment rule P such that for every δ > 0, we have x′(v/δ) = x′(v). For every player i ∈ N and
all bid profiles b ∈ B define
P˜i(b) = min
{
b(f(b))∑
i∈N Pi(b)
, 1
}
· Pi(b).
Then the mechanism with allocation rule f and payment rule P˜ is (λ, 0, µ1 + µ2)-outcome smooth.
Proof. Given a valuation profile v, we claim that the re-defined mechanism is (λ, 0, µ1+µ2)-outcome
smooth with respect to the same outcome x′(v).
Fix a bid profile b ∈ B and let δ = min
{
b(f(b))∑
i∈N Pi(b)
, 1
}
. Note that δ ≤ 1. Using out-
come smoothness of the original mechanism for valuation profile v/δ and corresponding outcome
x′(v/δ) = x′(v) we obtain
∑
i∈N
(
1
δ
· vi(x
′
i)− inf
b′i: f(b
′
i,b-i)x
′
i
Pi(b
′
i,b-i)
)
≥ λ ·
1
δ
· v(OPT(v)) − µ1 ·
∑
i∈N
Pi(b)− µ2 · b(f(b)).
Multiplying by δ, we have
∑
i∈N
(
vi(x
′
i)− δ · inf
b′i: f(b
′
i,b-i)x
′
i
Pi(b
′
i,b-i)
)
≥ λ · v(OPT(v))− µ1 · δ ·
∑
i∈N
Pi(b)− µ2 · δ · b(f(b)).
From the definition of P˜ and δ we know that δ · Pi(b
′
i,b-i) = P˜i(b
′
i,b-i), δ ·
∑
i∈N Pi(b) ≤ b(f(b)),
and δ · b(f(b)) ≤ b(f(b)). This yields
∑
i∈N
(
vi(x
′
i)− inf
b′i: f(b
′
i,b-i)xi
′
P˜i(b
′
i,b-i)
)
≥ λ · v(OPT(v)) − (µ1 + µ2) · b(f(b)).
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Another observation is that the function x′ of a weakly (λ, µ1, µ2)-outcome smooth mechanism
is indeed a λ-approximation of social welfare, which also implies that its range λ-approximates the
space of all outcome profiles.
Lemma H.1. Suppose Y is the range of x′. Then
max
y∈Y
∑
i∈N
vi(yi) ≥
∑
i∈N
vi(x
′(v)) ≥ λ · v(OPT(v)).
Proof. We use outcome smoothness setting the valuation profile to v and the bid profile to 0. Then
for y = x′(v), ∑
i∈N
(
vi(yi)− inf
b′i: f(b
′
i,0)yi
Pi(b
′
i, 0)
)
≥ λ · v(OPT(v)) .
As we assume that payments are never negative, this implies∑
i∈N
vi(yi) ≥ λ · v(OPT(v)) .
H.2 Constructing the Prices
We first have to define pi(xi | z) for all i ∈ N , z ∈ F , xi ∈ Xi. To this end, we create two additional
copies of each agent, implying that we have 3n agents overall. The different incarnations of agent
i, denoted by i, i + n, and i + 2n correspond to different roles when setting the prices. They
particularly ensure that agent i competes against itself.
In more detail, for i ∈ [n], the roles will be as follows in defining pi(xi | z). Agent i is used
to represent vi, agent i + n is used to represent zi and agent i + 2n tries to buy outcome xi in
the outcome-smooth mechanism. We will frequently map outcome profiles z ∈ F from the original
space of n agents to the agents n+1, . . . , 2n. This operation we denote by z. That is zi = zi−n for
i ∈ {n + 1, . . . , 2n} and zi = ∅ otherwise.
We will adopt the more general notion of weak outcome smoothness, from Appendix H.1. We
assume that outcome smoothness holds in every subinstance F ′/z of the extended outcome space
F ′. To avoid any possible confusion of the numbering of the agents, we denote by Gz, the outcome
space F ′/z padded with ∅ wherever zi 6= ∅. That is, Gz is isomorphic to F
′/z but uses the exact
same indices as F ′. We will denote the allocation rule of the outcome smooth mechanism in this
space by f( · | z) and its payment rule by P ( · | z).
Outcome smoothness now ensures that for all z ∈ F ′ and valuation profiles v ∈ V there exists
an outcome x′(v | z) ∈ Gz such that for all bid profiles b ∈ B,
3n∑
i=1
(
vi(x
′
i)− inf
b′i: fi((b
′
i,b-i)|z)x
′
i
Pi((b
′
i,b-i) | z)
)
≥ λ · v(OPT(v,Gz))− µ · b(f(b | z)).
Given these definitions, we define prices based on the payments in the outcome-smooth mech-
anism by
pvi (xi | z) = inf
b′i+2n: fi((b′i+2n,v−(i+2n))|z)xi
Pi
(
(b′i+2n,v−(i+2n))
∣∣ z) .
The meaning is as follows: Agents n + 1, . . . , 2n incorporate the allocation z and agents 1, . . . , n
represent the part of v(OPT(v)) that is not yet taken away by z. Now, another copy of agent i is
added to the system and competes with agents 1, . . . , n for the outcome.
33
H.3 Showing Balancedness
Let ALG denote the algorithm that returns OPT(v) with probability λ. We will show that the
constructed prices are (λ, µ/λ)-balanced with respect to ALG if they are monotone. To this end,
we define Fx as the range of x
′( · | z) on agents 2n+ 1, . . . , 3n. Formally,
Fx = {y ∈ X1 × . . .×Xn | ∃v : x
′(v | x) = y},
where y is the outcome profile on 3n agents that sets y2n+i = yi for i ∈ [n] and yi = ∅ for i ≤ 2n.
Lemma H.2. Suppose (f( · | z), P ( · | z)) is (λ, 0, µ)-outcome smooth on every Gz such that x
′(v |
z) = x′(ǫ · v | z) for every ǫ > 0, pvi is monotonically increasing, then p
v
i satisfies Condition (b) of
(α, β)-balancedness with β = µ/λ, for the choice of (Fx)x∈X described above.
Proof. Consider x and y ∈ Fx. By definition of Fx, we can find some v
′ such that x′(v′) = y.
Recall that, in allocation y, agents 1 through 2n obtain the empty allocation, and agents 2n + 1
through 3n receive allocation profile y.
By assumption for all ǫ > 0 we have x′(ǫ · v′) = y . Outcome smoothness for problem subin-
stances, with valuation profile ǫ · v′ and bid profile v implies
3n∑
i=1
(
ǫ · v′i(yi)− inf
b′i: fi((b
′
i,v-i)|x)yi
Pi((b
′
i,v-i) | x)
)
≥ λ · ǫ · v′(OPT(ǫ · v′,Gx))− µ · v(f(v | x)) .
As payments Pi are never negative, this implies
3n∑
i=2n+1
(
− inf
b′i: fi((b
′
i,v-i)|x)yi
Pi((b
′
i,v-i) | x)
)
≥ λ·ǫ·v′(OPT(ǫ·v′,Gx))−µ·v(f(v | x))−
3n∑
i=1
ǫ·v′i(yi) .
This implies
n∑
i=1
pvi (yi | x) =
3n∑
i=2n+1
inf
b′
i
: fi((b′i,v-i)|x)yi
Pi((b
′
i,v-i) | x)
≤ µ · v(f(v | x))− ǫ
(
3n∑
i=1
v′i(yi)− λ · v
′(OPT(ǫ · v′,Gx))
)
.
As this holds for all ǫ > 0, we also have
n∑
i=1
pvi (yi | x) ≤ µ · v(f(v | x)) ≤ µ · v(OPT((v1, . . . , vn, 0, . . . , 0),Gx)) ≤
µ
λ
v(OPT(v,Fx)) ,
where the last step uses Lemma H.1.
Lemma H.3. Suppose (f( · | z), P ( · | z)) is (λ, 0, µ)-outcome smooth on every Gz such that x
′(v |
z) = x′(ǫ · v | z) for every ǫ > 0, f is the declared welfare maximizer, and P is the first-price
payment rule. Then pvi satisfies Condition (a) of (α, β)-balancedness with α = λ, for the choice of
ALG and (Fx)x∈X described above.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary player i and arbitrary outcomes x ∈ F . To bound pi(xi | x[i−1]),
we consider player 2n + i in the outcome-smooth mechanism. Let b2n+i be a bid such that
f2n+i(b2n+i,v−(2n+i) | x[n+i−1])  xi. We show that for any such b2n+i, we have
Pi(b2n+i,v−(2n+i) | x[n+i−1]) ≥ v(OPT(v,Gx[n+i−1]))− v(OPT(v,Gx[n+i])) .
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As this holds for all b2n+i, this gives also a lower bound on the infimum.
In the following, we keep the allocation x[n+i−1] = (∅, . . . , ∅, x1, . . . , xi−1, ∅, . . . ∅) fixed and com-
pare the two possible feasible solutions a := f(b2n+i,v
(i−1)
−(2n+i) | x[n+i−1]) and q := OPT(v,Gx[n+i−1]).
As a maximizes (b2n+i, v−(2n+i)) when keeping x[n+i−1] fixed, we have
b2n+i(a2n+i) +
3n∑
j=1
j 6=2n+i
vj(aj) ≥ b2n+i(q2n+i) +
3n∑
j=1
j 6=n+i
vj(qj) .
As vj = 0 for all j > n, this is equivalent to
b2n+i(a2n+i) ≥ b2n+i(q2n+i) +
n∑
j=1
vj(qj)−
n∑
j=1
vj(aj) .
Now, observe that if we replace a2n+i by xi in allocation a, then the modified vector a
′ is still
feasible in the space that keeps x[n+i−1] fixed. By symmetry of players 2n + i and n + i, this also
means that (a1, . . . , an, ∅, . . . , ∅) ∈ Gx[n+i]. This implies
∑n
j=1 vj(aj) ≤ v(OPT(v,Gx[n+i])).
Overall, we get
pvi (xi | x[i−1]) ≥ v(OPT(v,Gx[n+i−1]))− v(OPT(v,Gx[n+i])) .
Summing up the prices for all players i and using a telescoping sum, this implies a lower bound of
n∑
i=1
pvi (xi | x[i−1]) ≥ v(OPT(v,Gx∅))− v(OPT(v,Gx[n]))
= v(OPT(v)) − v(OPT(v,Gx)) .
Finally, we have v(OPT(v)) = 1λv(ALG(v)) and v(OPT(v,Gx)) ≤
1
λv(OPT(v,Fx)) by Lemma H.1.
So, in combination
n∑
i=1
pvi (xi | x[i−1]) ≥
1
λ
(v(ALG(v)) − v(OPT(v,Fx))) .
I Proofs of Theorem 5.3 and Theorem 5.4
In this appendix we describe how to obtain balanced prices from smooth mechanisms in binary,
single-parameter settings. In these settings players can either “win” or ”lose”, and have a value
vi ∈ R≥0 for winning. Feasible solutions x ∈ F ⊆ {0, 1}
n are subsets of players that can win
simultaneously. For ease of notation we identify the vectors x ∈ F with the subset of players i ∈ N
for which xi = 1. This lets us write i ∈ x if xi = 1 and i 6∈ x otherwise.
I.1 Permeable Allocation Rules
We begin by defining the permeability of an allocation rule f , and by showing that (λ, µ)-smoothness
implies a bound on permeability.
An algorithm f for a binary, single-parameter problem is monotone if for every player i ∈ N ,
any two bids b′i ≥ bi, and any bid vector b-i,
fi(bi,b-i) = 1 ⇒ fi(b
′
i,b-i) = 1.
For monotone allocation rules the critical value for player i is the smallest bid that ensures that
player i wins against bids b-i. That is, τ
f
i (b-i) = inf{bi | fi(bi,b-i) = 1}.
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Definition I.1 (Du¨tting and Kesselheim [19], see also [38, 45, 30]). A monotone allocation algo-
rithm f for a binary, single parameter problem F is γ-permeable if γ ≥ 1 is the smallest multiplier
such that for all bid vectors b and all feasible allocations x ∈ F it holds that∑
i∈N : xi=1
τ fi (b-i) ≤ γ · b(f(b)). (16)
Theorem I.1 (Du¨tting and Kesselheim [19]). Suppose that the first-price mechanism M based on
allocation f is (λ, µ)-smooth, then f is γ-permeable with γ ≤ (µ + 1)/λ.
Proof. Given a bid vector b, we have to show that
∑
i: xi=1
τ fi (b-i) ≤
µ+1
λ · b(f(b)). To this end,
consider fixed x ∈ F and b. Let ǫ > 0 and let v be defined by vi = max{bi, τ
f
i (b-i)}. By smoothness
of M, there are b′i such that∑
i∈N
ui(b
′
i,b-i) ≥ λ · v(OPT(v)) − µ ·
∑
i∈N
Pi(b).
Observe that if i 6∈ f(b), then ui(b
′
i,b-i) ≤ 0 because τ
f
i (b-i) > bi and this means that i 6∈ f(b
′
i,b-i)
unless b′i > vi. None of these choices results in positive utility. Furthermore, for i ∈ f(b), we have
ui(b
′
i,b-i) ≤ vi = bi. Therefore
∑
i∈N ui(b
′
i,b-i) ≤ b(f(b)).
Next, we can lower-bound v(OPT(v)) by the value of the feasible solution x, which gives us
v(OPT(v)) ≥
∑
i: xi=1
vi ≥
∑
i: xi=1
(τ fi (b-i)− ǫ) ≥
∑
i: xi=1
τ fi (b-i)− nǫ.
Finally, as M is first-price, we also have
∑
i∈N Pi(b) = b(f(b)).
In combination this yields
b(f(b)) ≥ λ ·
( ∑
i: xi=1
τ fi (b-i)− nǫ
)
− µ · b(f(b)),
which implies ∑
i: xi=1
τ fi (b-i) ≤
µ+ 1
λ
· b(f(b)) + nǫ.
As this holds for all ǫ > 0, this shows the claim.
Applying Theorem I.1 to each problem in a collection of problems Π, we see that if a mechanism
M is (λ, µ)-smooth for Π then it is (µ + 1)/λ-permeable for Π.
Remark I.1. While the definition of permeability requires γ to be the smallest multiplier for which
inequality (16) is satisfied, all our results can be derived from any upper bound on this multiplier
at the cost of slightly worse guarantees.
I.2 Proof of Theorem 5.3
In this subsection we prove Theorem 5.3, which shows that (λ, µ)-smoothness of the greedy alloca-
tion rule for a subinstance-closed closed collection of binary, single-parameter problems Π implies
the existence of a weakly ((µ+ 1)/λ, 0, (µ + 1)/λ)-balanced pricing rule. By Theorem I.1, in order
to show this result, it suffices to show the following theorem.
Theorem I.2. Let ALG be any allocation rule. Suppose that the greedy allocation rule GRD is
γ-permeable for a subinstance-closed collection of binary, single-parameter feasibility problems Π.
Then for every v ∈ V there exists a pricing rule that is weakly (γ, 0, γ)-balanced with respect to
ALG and the canonical exchange-feasible sets (Fx)x∈X .
We first describe the pricing rule that achieves this result. Afterwards, we show that this pricing
rule has the desirable properties.
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I.2.1 Construction of the Prices
We set the price pi(zi | x) for player i ∈ N and outcome zi ∈ {0, 1} for arbitrary but fixed valuations
v and allocation x ∈ F through Algorithm 1. For this let GRD(v | x) ∈ Fx denote the allocation
that results if we go through the players in order of non-increasing value but only add a player if
he is not in x and feasible together with x and the previously accepted players.
We generally set pi(0 | x) = 0. That is, the price for losing is always zero. To determine the
price pi(1 | x) for winning we first compute a sequence of reference allocations r(0) ≥ · · · ≥ r(n) and
a sequence of reference valuations v(0) ≥ · · · ≥ v(n). We then set pi(1 | x) = vi if i ∈ r
(n), i.e., the
price of player i is that player’s valuation if he is part of the final reference allocation. Otherwise,
we set pi(1 | x) = inf{v
′
i : i ∈ GRD(v
′
i,v
(n)
−i | x)}, i.e., we set the price to the player’s critical value
against the players in the final reference allocation.
While we need to define prices pi(zi | x) for any possible allocation x ∈ F , the prices that player
i will actually see are the ones where x is set to the purchase decisions of the players j = 1, . . . , i−1
that precede player i in the ordering. Note that in this case xi = xi+1 = xn = 0 and therefore
r(n) = · · · = r(i−1) and v(n) = · · · = v(i−1). We use the shorthand τGRDi (v
(i−1)
−i | x[i−1]) := inf{v
′
i :
i ∈ GRD(v′i,v
(i−1)
−i | x[i−1])}.
Algorithm 1: Pricing Rule Derived from GRD (Parametrized by ALG)
Input: zi ∈ {0, 1}, v, x ∈ F
Output: pi(zi | x)
if zi = 0 then
// In this case the price is simply zero
pi(zi | x) = 0
else
// First determine reference allocation and valuations
r(0) ← ALG(v), v
(0)
k ← vk if k ∈ r
(0) and v
(0)
k ← 0 otherwise
for j ← 1 to n do
r(j) ← GRD(v(j−1) | x[j]), v
(j)
k ← v
(j−1)
k = vk if k ∈ r
(j) and v
(j)
k ← 0 else
// Now determine the price
if i ∈ r(n) then
// If player i is part of the reference allocation he pays his valuation
pi(zi | x)← vi
else
// Otherwise he pays the critical value against the players in the reference allocation
pi(zi | x)← inf{v
′
i : i ∈ GRD(v
′
i,v
(n)
−i | x)}
return pi(zi | x)
I.2.2 Proof of Theorem I.2
We prove the theorem in two steps. We first use permeability of the greedy allocation rule to
establish Condition (a) (in Lemma I.1). We then show Condition (b). For this we first prove a
novel combinatorial implication of permeability of the greedy allocation rule (in Lemma I.2) by
considering valuations that are either zero or one. We then use this property in a careful layering
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argument to establish Condition (b) (in Lemma I.3).
Lemma I.1. Let ALG be any allocation rule. Suppose that the greedy allocation rule GRD is γ-
permeable for a subinstance-closed collection of binary, single-parameter problems Π. Then the
pricing rule described in Algorithm 1 fulfills Condition (a) of Definition 3.2 with α = γ with respect
to allocation rule ALG and the canonical exchange-feasible sets (Fx)x∈X .
Proof. Let x ∈ F . We will show that pi(xi | x[i−1]) ≥
1
γ · (v(r
(i−1))−v(r(i))). By a telescoping-sum
argument, this then implies
∑
i∈N
pi(xi | x[i−1]) ≥
∑
i∈N
1
γ
·
(
v(r(i−1))− v(r(i))
)
=
1
γ
·
(
v(r(0))− v(r(n))
)
≥
1
γ
·
(
v(ALG(v)) − v(OPT(v,Fx))
)
,
where the last step follows from the fact that r(0) = ALG(v) and r(n) ∈ Fx.
So, it only remains to show pi(xi | x[i−1]) ≥
1
γ · (v(r
(i−1)) − v(r(i))). Observe that if xi = 0,
we have r(i−1) = r(i) and this claim follows trivially. So, consider an arbitrary player i for which
xi = 1. If i ∈ r
(i−1) then r(i−1) \ r(i) = {i}. So pi(1 | x[i−1]) = vi, while v(r
(i−1))− v(r(i)) = vi and
the claim is true.
Otherwise, i 6∈ r(i−1), and we will first use smoothness with respect to subinstances to bound
the size of the set r(i−1) \ r(i). For a fixed ǫ > 0, define v′ by setting v′i = τ
GRD
i (v
(i−1)
−i | x[i−1]) + ǫ,
v′j = vj for j ∈ r
(i−1) \ r(i), and v′j = 0 for all other j.
Now player i ∈ GRD(v′ | x[i−1]∪r
(i)) by definition of v′ and v′i in particular, while for each player
j ∈ r(i−1) \ r(i) we have j 6∈ GRD(v′ | x[i−1]∪ r
(i)) because it cannot be added to x[i−1] ∪ r
(i) ∪{i} =
x[i] ∪ r
(i) by definition of r(i). Hence, the greedy critical values of each player j ∈ r(i−1) \ r(i) must
be at least τGRDj (v
′ | x[i−1] ∪ r
(i)) ≥ v′i.
Since both player i and the set of players r(i−1) \ r(i) are feasible extensions to x[i−1] ∪ r
(i), we
can use γ-permeability of the greedy allocation rule in the subinstance in which we hold x[i−1]∪r
(i)
fixed to obtain,
|r(i−1) \ r(i)| · v
′
i ≤
∑
j∈r(i−1)\r(i)
τGRDj (v
′ | x[i−1] ∪ r
(i)) ≤ γ · v′
(
GRD(v′ | x[i−1] ∪ r
(i))
)
= γ · v′i.
Cancelling v′i shows that |r
(i−1) \ r(i)| ≤ γ.
To show the claim it now suffices to observe that the greedy critical value of player i in the
subinstance where we hold x[i−1] fixed under the original valuations is the highest value of a player
j ∈ r(i−1) \ r(i). Namely,
pi(1 | x[i−1]) = max
j∈r(i−1)\r(i)
vj ≥
1
γ
·
∑
j∈r(i−1)\r(i)
vj = v(r
(i−1))− v(r(i)),
which concludes the proof.
Lemma I.2. Suppose that the greedy allocation rule GRD is γ-permeable for a subinstance-closed
collection of problems of binary, single-parameter problems Π. Consider any problem π ∈ Π with
feasibility structure F . Furthermore, let B0 ⊇ B1 ⊇ . . . ⊇ Bn and A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ An with
Bt ∪ At ∈ F for all t. Consider a set C that fulfills C ∪ An ∈ F and for every i ∈ C there is a
t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} with i ∈ Bt or {i} ∪Bt ∪At 6∈ F . Then we have |C| ≤ γ · |B0|.
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Proof. Set Bn+1 = ∅ and define Cn+1 = C. Furthermore, define Ct for 0 ≤ t ≤ n recursively as a
maximal subset of the players in Ct+1 \Bt such that Ct ∪At ∪Bt ∈ F .
We will show that for all t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n},
|Ct+1 \ Ct| ≤ γ · |Bt \Bt+1|.
Consider some fixed t and define D := Bt ∩ Ct+1.
Now a crucial observation is that the set Ct+1\(Ct∪D) is feasible holding E := Bt+1∪At∪Ct∪D
fixed. This is because(
Ct+1 \ (Ct ∪D)
)
∪Bt+1 ∪At ∪Ct ∪D = Bt+1 ∪At ∪ Ct+1 ⊆ Bt+1 ∪At+1 ∪Ct+1 ∈ F .
Further note that by the way we have chosen Ct we know that Bt \ (Bt+1 ∪D) is another feasible
extension to E because
(Bt \ (Bt+1 ∪D)) ∪Bt+1 ∪At ∪ Ct ∪D = Bt ∪At ∪Ct ∈ F .
To apply γ-permeability in the subinstance where we hold E fixed, define a valuation profile v¯
by setting v¯i = 1 for i ∈ Bt \ (Bt+1 ∪D) and 0 otherwise. Now, for every i ∈ Ct+1 \ (Ct ∪D), we
have
τGRDi (v¯ | E) = 1.
This is due to the maximality of Ct: If for some i ∈ Ct+1 \ (Ct ∪ D) this value is 0, then also
{i} ∪ (Bt \ (Bt+1 ∪D)) ∪Bt+1 ∪At ∪ Ct ∪D ∈ F .
So by permeability,
|Ct+1 \ (Ct ∪D)| =
∑
i∈Ct+1\(Ct∪D)
τGRDi (v¯ | E) ≤ γ · v¯(GRD(v¯ | E)) = γ · |Bt \ (Bt+1 ∪D)|,
and therefore
|Ct+1 \ Ct| = |D|+ |Ct+1 \ (Ct ∪D)| ≤ |D|+ γ · |Bt \ (Bt+1 ∪D)| ≤ γ · |Bt \Bt+1|.
We now obtain the desired bound on the size of the set C by summing the previous inequality
over all t and using that it becomes a telescoping sum
|C|+ |C0| = |Cn+1|+ |C0| =
n∑
t=0
|Ct+1 \ Ct| ≤ γ ·
n∑
t=0
|Bt \Bt+1| = γ · (|B0| − |Bn+1|) = γ · |B0|.
It remains to show that all players in C will be covered (i.e., that C0 = ∅). This follows from the
fact that for each player i ∈ C by the definition of C there exists a t such that i ∈ Bt or i does not
fit into Bt ∪At and, thus, in either case i 6∈ Ct.
Lemma I.3. Let ALG be any allocation rule. Suppose that the greedy allocation rule GRD is
γ-permeable for a subinstance-closed collection of binary, single-parameter problems Π. Then the
pricing rule described in Algorithm 1 fulfills Condition (b) of Definition 3.2 with β1 = 0 and β2 = γ
with respect to allocation rule ALG and the canonical exchange-feasible sets (Fx)x∈X .
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Figure 1: Our proof that the pricing rule derived from the greedy allocation rule satisfies Condition
(b), relies on the fact that we can chop the valuation and price space into discrete layers, which
reduces the problem to 0/1-valuations.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary feasible x ∈ F and an arbitrary feasible extension x′ ∈ Fx. We want
to show that ∑
i∈N
pi(x
′
i | x[i−1]) ≤ γ · v(ALG(v)).
We will prove this claim through a layering argument; as depicted in Figure 1. To this end, let
v(j) be the j-th highest value of v1, . . . , vn; furthermore v(n+1) = 0. For each j ∈ [n], let S
j denote
the set of players with value at least v(j) and let T
j denote the set of players with x′i = 1 that see
a price pi(1 | x[i−1]) of at least v(j).
We now apply Lemma I.2 for each j ∈ [n] by setting At = x[t], Bt = r
(t)∩Sj, C = T j. Note that
C ∪ An ∈ F and for every i ∈ C there is a t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} such that i ∈ Bt or {i} ∪Bt ∪ At 6∈ F .
We obtain |T j | ≤ γ · |r(0) ∩ Sj|.
We conclude that
∑
i∈N
pi(x
′
i | x[i−1]) =
∑
i∈N
n∑
j=1
1i∈T j · (v(j) − v(j+1))
=
n∑
j=1
|T j| · (v(j) − v(j+1))
≤
n∑
j=1
γ · |r(0) ∩ Sj | · (v(j) − v(j+1))
= γ · v(ALG(v)) ,
where the first equality holds by definition of the sets T j, the second equality is basic calculus, the
inequality follows from Lemma I.2 as argued above, and the final equality holds by definition of
r(0) = ALG(v) and the sets Sj.
I.3 Proof of Theorem 5.4
In this subsection we prove Theorem 5.4, which claims that (λ, µ)-smoothness of the pay-your-
bid mechanism based on the welfare-maximizing allocation rule for subinstance-closed collection
of binary, single-parameter problems Π implies the existence of a weakly (1, (µ + 1)/λ)-balanced
pricing rule. By Theorem I.1 it suffices to show the following theorem.
Theorem I.3. Let ALG be any allocation rule. Suppose that the welfare-maximizing allocation
rule OPT is γ-permeable for a subinstance-closed collection of binary, single-parameter feasibility
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problems Π. Then there exists a pricing rule that is weakly (1, 0, γ2)-balanced with respect to ALG
and the canonical exchange-feasible sets (Fx)x∈X .
As in the case of greedy we first describe the construction of the prices, and then we show that
these prices are balanced.
I.3.1 Construction of the Prices
We define the price pi(zi | x) for player i ∈ N and outcome zi ∈ {0, 1} and arbitrary but fixed
valuation profile v and allocation x ∈ F through Algorithm 2. For this section, define OPT(v | x)
as the allocation that results by padding the welfare-maximizing allocation for valuation profile v
over F/x with empty allocations.
As in the the case of the greedy allocation rule, we again set pi(0 | x) = 0 and we compute
pi(1 | x) via reference allocations and reference valuations. We again define the initial reference
allocation as r(0) = ALG(v) and the initial reference valuations by setting v
(0)
j = vj for j ∈ r
(0) and
v
(0)
j = 0 otherwise. The subsequent reference allocations and valuations are defined recursively as
r(i) = OPT(v(i−1) | x[i]) and v
(i)
j = v
(i−1)
j = vj for j ∈ r
(0) and v
(i)
j = 0 otherwise. We then set
pi(1 | x) = vi if i ∈ r
(n) and pi(1 | x) = inf{v
′
i | i ∈ OPT(v
′
i,v
(n)
-i | x)} otherwise. Note that this
definition immediately implies that pi(xi | x[i−1]) = v(r
(i−1))− v(r(i)).
By substituting all occurrences of n with i− 1 we obtain the formula for the price pi(1 | x[i−1]).
We use the shorthand τOPT(v
(i−1)
-i | x[i−1]) := inf{v
′
i | i ∈ OPT(v
′
i,v
(i−1)
-i ) | x[i−1])}.
Algorithm 2: Pricing Rule Derived from OPT (Parametrized by ALG)
Input: zi ∈ {0, 1}, v, x ∈ F
Output: pi(zi | x)
if zi = 0 then
// In this case the price is simply zero
pi(zi | x) = 0
else
// First determine reference allocation and valuations
r(0) ← ALG(v), v
(0)
k ← vk if k ∈ r
(0) and v
(0)
k ← 0 otherwise
for j ← 1 to n do
r(j) ← OPT(v(j−1) | x[j]), v
(j)
k ← v
(j−1)
k = vk if k ∈ r
(j) and v
(j)
k ← 0 else
// Now determine the price
if i ∈ r(n) then
// If player i is part of the reference allocation he pays his valuation
pi(zi | x)← vi
else
// Otherwise he pays the critical value against the players in the reference allocation
pi(zi | x)← inf{v
′
i : i ∈ OPT(v
′
i,v
(n)
−i | x)}
return pi(zi | x)
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I.3.2 Proof of Theorem I.3
We again proceed in two steps. We first show Condition (a) (in Lemma I.4 below). Afterwards
we show that the permeability of OPT provides an upper bound on the permeability of GRD and
that the critical prices with respect to OPT are not much higher than those with respect to GRD
(in Lemmas I.5 and I.6). This allows us to bound Condition (b) using the same machinery that we
used in the previous section (in Lemma I.7)
Lemma I.4. Let ALG be any allocation rule. Suppose that the welfare-maximizing allocation rule
OPT is γ-permeable for a subinstance-closed collection of problems of binary, single-parameter
problems Π. Then the pricing rule described in Algorithm 2 fulfills Condition (a) of Definition 3.2
with α = 1 with respect to allocation rule ALG and the canonical exchange-feasible sets (Fx)x∈X .
Proof. Consider x ∈ F . We defined prices exactly so that pi(xi | x[i−1]) = v(r
(i−1)) − v(r(i)).
Therefore, using a telescoping-sum argument, we get∑
i∈N
pi(xi | x[i−1]) = v(r
(0))− v(r(n)).
The claim now follows from the fact that r(0) = ALG(v) and r(n) ∈ Fx.
Lemma I.5. If the greedy allocation rule GRD is γGRD-permeable and the welfare-maximizing allo-
cation rule OPT is γOPT-permeable for a subinstance-closed collection of of binary, single-parameter
problems Π, then γOPT ≥ γGRD.
Proof. We only have to show that for all x ∈ F , x′ ∈ Fx and all v, we have∑
i∈x′
τGRDi (v-i | x) ≤ γ
OPT · v(GRD(v | x)).
Let y = x′ ∩ GRD(v | x). Observe that because y ⊆ GRD(v | x), we have GRD(v | x ∪ y) =
GRD(v | x). Define a valuation profile v′ by setting v′i = vi for all i ∈ x
′ \ Q and v′i = 0
otherwise. By loser independence of greedy, GRD(v | x ∪ y) = GRD(v′ | x ∪ y). Furthermore,
OPT(v′ | x ∪ y) = GRD(v′ | x ∪ y).
We claim that for i ∈ x′ \ y we have
τGRDi (v-i | x) ≤ τ
GRD
i (v
′
-i | x ∪ y) ≤ τ
OPT
i (v
′
-i | x ∪ y) .
For the first inequality we use that τGRDi (v-i | x) is the value vj of some j that has to be outbid
by player i. By fixing another set y, this value can only go up because the options are limited
further. Also, when fixing x ∪ y, replacing the valuations by v′ has no influence because the set of
players that are selected remains unchanged.
The second inequality holds because under v′ player i in order to win when we hold x∪y fixed
has to force some subset z ⊆ GRD(v′-i | x ∪ y) = OPT(v
′
-i | x ∪ y) out of the solution. Under
OPT his payment is the sum of the respective players’ valuations, under GRD it is just the highest
valuation of any such player.
On the other hand, for players i ∈ y, because y ⊆ GRD(v | x), the greedy critical value
τGRDi (v-i | x) is at most vi.
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Using these two bounds on τGRDi (v-i | x) we obtain,∑
i∈x′
τGRDi (v-i | x) ≤
∑
i∈y
vi +
∑
i∈x′\y
τGRDi (v-i | x)
≤
∑
i∈y
vi +
∑
i∈x′\y
τOPTi (v
′
-i | x ∪ y)
≤
∑
i∈y
vi + γ
OPT · v′(OPT(v′ | x ∪ y))
=
∑
i∈y
vi + γ
OPT · v′(GRD(v′ | x ∪ y))
≤ γOPT ·
∑
i∈y
vi + γ
OPT · v′(GRD(v′ | x ∪ y))
= γOPT · v(OPT(v | x) ,
where the third inequality use γOPT-permeability of the welfare-maximizing allocation rule OPT in
the subinstance in which we hold x∪y fixed, the subsequent equality holds by the definition of v′,
the fourth inequality uses that γOPT ≥ 1, and the final equality holds by the definition of y and
v′.
Lemma I.6. If the greedy allocation rule GRD is γGRD-permeable for a subinstance-closed collection
of of binary, single-parameter problems Π, then
τOPTi (v
(i−1) | x[i−1]) ≤ γ
GRD · τGRDi (v
(i−1) | x[i−1])
Proof. Note that for valuations v(i−1) both GRD and OPT over F/x return the same set of players.
The same is true if we drop any player j from v(i−1). Dropping player i we can define y =
GRD(v
(i−1)
-i | x[i−1]) = OPT(v
(i−1)
-i | x[i−1]).
Now consider player i bidding b′i = τ
GRD
i (v
(i−1)
-i | x[i−1]) + ǫ. Then i ∈ GRD(b
′
i,v
(i−1)
-i | x[i−1]).
The addition of player i causes the removal of a (possibly empty) subset of players z ⊆ y. That is,
GRD(b′i,v
(i−1)
-i | x[i−1]) = (y \ z) ∪ {i}.
Define valuations v′ by setting v′i = b
′
i, v
′
j = v
(i−1)
j for j ∈ z, and v
′
j = 0 for every other player
j. Consider the subinstance in which we hold y \ z fixed. Since both player i and the set of players
z are feasible extensions we can apply γGRD-permeability of the greedy allocation rule to obtain
|z| · b′i =
∑
j∈z
τGRDj (v
′ | y \ z) ≤ γGRD · v′(GRD(v′ | y \ z)) = γGRD · b′i,
and therefore |z| ≤ γGRD.
The final step is now to observe that the critical value τOPTi (v
(i−1) | x[i−1]) of player i under
the welfare-maximizing allocation rule is at most |T | times the critical value pGRDi (v
(i−1) | x[i−1]) of
player i under the greedy allocation rule. To see this let z′ ⊆ y be the set with the smallest value
such that (y \ z′) ∪ {i} ∈ F . Then,
τOPTi (v
(i−1) | x[i−1]) =
∑
j∈z′
vj ≤
∑
j∈z
vj ≤ |T | ·max
j∈z
vj = |z| · τ
GRD
i (v
(i−1) | x[i−1]),
where we used that z is some subset of y such that (y \ z)∪{i} ∈ F and so its combined value can
only be larger than that of z′.
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Lemma I.7. Let ALG be any allocation rule. Suppose that the welfare-maximizing allocation rule
OPT is γ-permeable for a subinstance-closed collection of binary, single-parameter problems Π.
Then the pricing rule described in Algorithm 2 fulfills Condition (b) of Definition 3.2 with β1 = 0
and β2 = γ
2 with respect to allocation rule ALG and the canonical exchange-feasible sets (Fx)x∈X .
Proof. Consider an arbitrary allocation x ∈ F and feasible extension x′ ∈ Fx. We want to show
that ∑
i∈N
pi(x
′
i | x[i−1]) ≤ (γ
OPT)2 · v(ALG(v)).
We will again show this claim through layering. This time, however, we need the layering to
arbitrarily fine-grained. We will specify the granularity by ǫ > 0. For each j ∈ N, let Sj denote the
set of players with value at least j · ǫ. Let T j denote the set of players with x′i = 1 that see a price
pOPTi (x
′
i | x[i−1]) of at least γ
GRD · j · ǫ.
For any fixed j ∈ N we now bound |T j | using Lemma I.2. We set At = x[t], Bt = r
(t) ∩ Sj ,
C = T j. Note that C ∪An ∈ F . We claim that for every i ∈ C we have i ∈ Bt or {i}∪Bt ∪At 6∈ F
for t = i−1. To see this, consider the two options how pOPTi (x
′
i | x[i−1]) can be set. If i ∈ r
(i−1), then
pOPTi (x
′
i | x[i−1]) = vi. As by definition p
OPT
i (x
′
i | x[i−1]) ≥ γ
GRD · j · ǫ ≥ j · ǫ, this implies vi ≥ j · ǫ
and so i ∈ Bi−1 = r
(i−1)∩Sj. Otherwise, if i 6∈ r(i−1), then pOPTi (x
′
i | x[i−1]) = τ
OPT
i (v
(i−1)
-i | x[i−1]).
In this case, we can apply Lemma I.6 to get
pOPTi (x
′
i | x[i−1]) = τ
OPT
i (v
(i−1)
-i | x[i−1]) ≤ γ
GRD · τGRDi (v
(i−1)
-i | x[i−1]).
So, we know that τGRDi (v
(i−1)
-i | x[i−1]) ≥ j · ǫ and therefore {i} ∪ x[i−1] ∪ (r
(i−1) ∩ Y j) 6∈ F .
So, by Lemma I.2, we get |T j| ≤ γGRD · |r(0) ∩ Y j |.
We conclude that
∑
i∈x′
pOPTi (x
′
i | x[i−1]) ≤ nǫ+
∑
i∈x′
∞∑
j=1
1i∈T j · γ
GRD · ǫ
= nǫ+ γGRD ·
∞∑
j=1
|T j| · ǫ
≤ nǫ+ γGRD ·
∞∑
j=1
γGRD · |r(0) ∩ Y j| · ǫ
≤ (γGRD)2 · v(ALG(v)) + 2nǫ.
As this argument holds for any ǫ > 0, we also have
∑
i∈x′ p
OPT
i (x
′
i | x[i−1]) ≤ (γ
GRD)2 · v(ALG(v)).
By Lemma I.5, γGRD ≤ γOPT and the claim follows.
Remark I.2. When the prices defined by Algorithm 2 are non-decreasing then γ-permeability
of OPT immediately implies that τGRDi (v
(i−1)
−i | x[i−1]) ≤ τ
GRD
i (v
(i−1)
−i | x) ≤ γ · v(OPT(v,Fx))
implying that the pricing rule is (α, β)-balanced with β = γ. In this case Theorem I.3 can be
strengthened to show the existence of a (1, γ)-balanced pricing rule.
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